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ABSTRACT

The study, Henry Hardtner, Pioneer in Southern Forestry:

An

Analysis of the Economic Bases of His Reforestation Program, was under—
taken to analyze the economic and institutional bases of an early decision

to reforest cutover land as a private business venture*

The case chosen

is that of Henry E* Hardtner of Urania Lumber Company, who in 1913 secured
the first reforestation contract with the State of Louisiana*

Chapter I portrays the streams of cultural influence which blended
to form Louisiana’s forest land use heritage*

The land-use traditions

of the southeastern states, the naval-stores industry, the development
of industrial logging in the South at the time of its migration from the
Lake States, and the influences of German forestry ideas on the thought of
the day, are considered*
Chapter U traces the beginnings of the Hardtner timber investments

and the early growth of the Urania Lumber Company, followed by a biographi
cal sketch of Henry Hardtner in Chapter III*

The silvicultural measures taken to implement the Urania reforestation

program are considered in Chapter IV*
The economic aspects of the Urania reforestation program are dealt

with in Chapter V.

In a discussion of the cutover land problem in the

South, Hardtner’s views are contrasted with those of his contemporaries*

Hardtner’s analysis of compound interest in relation to forestry invest
ments is developed*
Chapter VI deals with the economic aspects of the relationships in

volved in the transition of the lumber industry from a mining to a repro
ducing or regenerative one*

The failure of Hardtner’s contemporaries to
v

accept his thesis of the profitability of reforestation is attributed

to the time span in timber production which was bayond the grasp of cur

rent economic expectations#

vi

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Henry Hardtner made a unique economic decision when in 1913, as

President of Urania Lumber Company of Urania, Louisiana, he placed
2^,719 acres of his cutover forest lands under reforestation contract

with the State of Louisiana*

His earlier decision that it would be a

profitable business venture to invest in cutover forest land as a long

term investment was the crucial one which prompted his action in plac

ing his lands under contract with the state*
Reforestation Contract No* 1 was entered into on June 111, 1913, be

tween Henry E* Hardtner, President of Urania Lumber Company, and the Con

servation Commission of the State of Louisiana,under the legal sanction
of Act No* 261, Louisiana Laws of 1910*

The pertinent provisions of

the act as applied to this reforestation contract were as follows:
1* Any owner of land which had been denuded of trees or other lands

assessed at the value of not more than $5»00 per acre could enter into a
reforestation contract with the State of Louisiana*

2* The owner of the land under contract was required to use ac

cepted forestry practices in the management of the land*

3* The landowner was required to maintain an adequate fire-protection
system*
U* The owner of the contract lands could not cut or remove any trees
except as permitted in the contract*

The contract was made retroactive to January 1, 1913»
1

2

The lands covered by such contract would be assessed at a val

uation of fl.00 per acre for the life of the contract.

It the expira

tion of the contract, the lands would be assessed as any other lands of

like value and condition in the same locality.
The uniqueness of Hardtner* s decision can be seen clearly only in
its historical context.

Cutover lands at the time were thought to be

valueless to most lumbermen.

Once the trees had been cut from the land,

the cutover land was disposed of in any expedient way:

sold as * agricul

tural land,” reverted to the state for non-payment of taxes, or if it was
kept, generally neglected with frequent fires preventing what reproduction

of trees might have occurred.

These lands were known as ”stump wastes”

and wastes they were - both to the landowner holding them and to the
state since the tax revenues collected on them were negligible.

Among the lumbermen in Louisiana, Hardtner was alone in his attitude
toward the cutover lands.

No other forest landowners in the state took

advantage of the reforestation contract provisions of Act No. 261 until

nine years after Hardtner entered into his contract.

In 1922 the Great

Southern Lumber Company (now Gaylord Container Corporation) of Bogalusa

entered into a similar contract.

2

At a time when other lumbermen were

disposing of their cutover lands, Hardtner was buying such lands and of
fering to show anyone interested how he calculated that they would be a
safe business investment.

2

He set up plots on his lands to show the ef-

In 1913 Reforestation Contract No. 2 was signed by Quinton T.
Hardtner and Milton Tannehill of Urania, Louisiana, covering 2,000 acres
of cutover lands. Both, however, were connected with the Urania Lumber
Company. The contract of the Great Southern Lumber Company was under the
sanction of Act No. 90 of 1922 which superceded Act No. 261 of 1910.

3

fects of fire and hogs on the reproduction of pines.

His speeches and

writings reveal a deep and sensitive understanding of the problems of

the lumber industry and of the effect of the "cut-out and get-out” policy

of the day on the communities which were left in the wake of the great
lumber nomad.

In his day Hardtner was regarded by many lumberman as an eccentric

and even an outright fraud for claiming that he was successful in growing
a second generation of pine trees on his land.

Although a thorough study

has not been published dealing with Hardtner’s contributions to the

lumber industry, recent writers in brief references have belatedly ac
corded to Hardtner a part of the recognition he .deserves.

William B«

Greeley, formerly Chief Forester of the U. S. Forest Service, wrote in

1951 of Hardtner:
"Many lumbermen and foresters made pilgrimages to Urania,
Louisiana. It was the mecca of piney woods forestry . . . .
Roaming over his ’longleaf pastures1 with ’Marse Henry,’ I
learned more dirt forestry of the South than I had ever
gleaned from textbooks or lectures. He had an indefatigable
zest for finding things out himself. He had learned when the
longleaf seedlings should be lightly burned to free their
needles of the brown-spot fungus. He had areas of saplings,
side by side, one regularly burned, the other kept meticu
lously free of fire, to show the actual effect of the preva
lent woods burning upon the mortality and growth rate in
young pine forests. He had seeding plots and thinning plots,
running the whole gamut of southern pine silviculture. And
he told his wealth of experience, the things he had learned
by trial and error, in a homey, down-to-earth way that took
hold. My days with Henry Hardtner were inspiring. He had
the unconscious power of a man whose taproots grip Mother
Earth. He was a great leader of southern lumbermen toward a
new order of land use ... ."3

o

Greeley, William B», Forests and Men (Garden City, N.Y. s Doubleday
& Co., Inc., 1951), p. 127.-—— —"

1*
I

Stanley F* Horn characterised Hardtner as ’’forestry’s Moses in the

South” and "the first practical lumberman to practice tree-growing on a

commercial basis*”
Aside from silvicultural studies published on plots established st
Urania and such brief references as those above, Hardtner’s contribution

to southern forestry has been largely neglected*

Nothing has been pub

lished on the economic aspects of his reforestation program and the

economic theory which he developed applicable to the lumber industry*
Thus, in choosing this subject for the present study, the writer be

lieves that the presentation and analysis of Hardtner’s economic calcu
lations in their historical context may contribute to an understanding of

forest valuation judgments.

In an era when contingencies for gain or loss

ten years in the future were hardly considered economic realities and
barely conceivable, a program of forest investment such as that of the

Urania Lumber Company, based on a forty-year span of time, exhibits such
a measure of assurance and confidence in the basis of judgment that it

deserves study, particularly since the judgments involved were vindicated*
The historical approach used in this study has not been widely
recognized as a productive approach by forest economists*

Until recently,

forest economics has been considered almost the exclusive domain of

foresters.

However, in a recent study sponsored by the Society of American

Foresters, the authors stated:
"Although foresters with advanced training in economics
have dominated forest economics research and probably will
continue to do so, it would be desirable to attract to this

^Horn, Stanley F*, This Fascinating Lumber Business (New York: The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 191*3), p* 59*

5
research field more economists with training and research
experience in other branches of economics*"?

It is believed that the historical approach will prove to be a
useful one in forest economics, particularly in view of the critical

nature of the time element involved in supply adjustments*

^Kaufert, Frank H« and William H* Cummings, Forestry and Related
Research in North America (Washington, E*C*: Society of American
Fores ters7~l$55), p*

CHAPTER II
LOUISIANA ’S TOREST LAND USE HERITAGE

Lumber production in Louisiana did not develop to any extent until
the 1880’s.

Prior to this time, only small inroads had been made into

the pine forests near the major waterways and railroads.
previously been the main source of timber in the state.

Cypress had

By 1800, twenty

small sawmills were operating in Louisiana, producing lumber for sugar
boxesAn early steam-powered sawmill was built in New Orleans in 1811,

but as late as 1883 New Orleans found it cheaper to import pine lumber
by water from the Gulf Coast states than to utilize small-scale local

3

operations in the state.

Louisiana’s forest-use traditions are chiefly derived from three
sources:

the high-grade logging and naval-stores traditions and cus

toms in the Atlantic Seaboard states, the traditions and customs of in

dustrial lumbering in the Lake States, and the economic theories and
practices of German forestry.

In states along the Atlantic Seaboard, the forest resource had been
exploited in one way or another almost from the landing of the first

colonists.

High-grade logging, the naval-stores industry, and livestock

^Hawk, Emory Q., Economic History of the South (New York? Prentice-

Hall, Inc., 193h), p. TFT.
^Glover, John George and William Bouck Cornell (Eds.), The Develop
ment of American Industries, Rev. Ed. (New York: Prentice-HaII7 Inc.,
1956), p. Ida. According io these writers, the steam sawmill erected at
New Orleans was immediately destroyed by workmen.

3

^Phillips, Travis, "Louisiana Forests:
V (1955), 22.
6

1880,” Forests & People.
-------------

Figure 1*

Forest Regions of Louisiana in 1912* J* H» Foster,
Assistant Chief, State Cooperation, made an extensive
study of Louisiana forests and forest industries in
February and March of 1910 with the aid of the State
Land Office, the Registrar granting him |2$0 in the
capacity of State Forester under Act 113 of 1904.
The 120-page report filed with the State Land Office
as a result of this investigation was the basis of
much of the 1910 conservation legislation*
Source: J. H. Foster, Forest Conditions in Louisiana
(U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service Bulletin
114, 1912).

8

grazing in the forest had developed over a period of 200 years in these
states as a relatively stable land-use form.

As it worked out in Louisi

ana, however, industrial logging moving in from the Lake States arrived
in the state before the joint forest-use system developed in the south

eastern states had extended into Louisiana and therefore had the greatest

influence on the state’s lumber development*
German forestry theories permeated the practice of forestry in the

United States during the early part of the 1900’s*

All of the early

foresters in the United States were deeply influenced by French and
German forestry traditions, since no forest science as such existed in
the United States at the time*

While none of the lumbermen in the early

days practiced forestry on their timberlands, the influence of German
theories on state forestry reinforced the common belief that laissez
faire lumbering and forestry were incompatible*

Thus, most of the early

forestry literature in the United States dealt with state plans and

policies based on intangible values such as flood and erosion control
to the exclusion of the forest economics of private enterprise*

In order to get a picture of the development of Louisiana’s lumber
industry during the early 1900’s when Reforestation Contract No* 1 was

entered into, it will be necessary to examine these three streams of cul
tural tradition*

The Southern Land Use Tradition

When the first settlers landed at Jamestown they were faced with an
entirely new set of natural factors*

The unending forest was both the

symbol of virgin fertility and the major obstacle to their agricultural

pursuits*

The colonists had to adopt an entirely new approach to agri

culture involving the application of relatively scarce and expensive labor

9

to the extensive use of rich land which could be had virtually for its

clearing®

They learned from the Indians the essential technique of ex

tensive agriculture as described by John Smith in 1612:

"The greatest labor they take is in planting their come,
for the country naturally is overgrown© with wood®
To pre
pare the ground they bruise the barke of the trees neare the
roots, then do they scorch the roots with fire until they
grow no more® The next year * • . corne is planted."^
The result of the early adjustment of the European settlers to the
new surroundings in America was the development of two basic southern
customs.

The first of these was the use of fire as a basic tool for ex

tensive clearing of the woods for agriculture.

Fire could clear fields,

clear brush from the woods and leave the ground free from litter, expos

ing acorns and grasses for hogs and cattle.

Hartman says of the southern

custom of woods burning:
"For three centuries people in the South have practiced
woods burning*
The custom began in the Coastal Plain flatwoods,
where groups of settlers had to clear ground for farming and
then for livestock. They soon learned that late winter was
a critical period for their stock—the ground had a cover of
dead grass, needles, and litter, and the animals fared badly.
But on a fresh winter burn new and succulent grass would spring
up and tide their stock over until spring. They set fires also
to clear the woods of varmints*"$
Potash and its refined form, pearl ash, were by-products of the early

woods burning practice in the South, particularly from the leachings of
oak and hickory ashes*^

Potash was exported to England for use in bleach-

^Bogart, E. L. and C. M. Thompson, Readings in the Economic History
of the United States (New York: Longmans Green & Go., 1916), p. 2^7

^Hartman, A. W., "Fire as a Tool in Southern Pine," Yearbook of

Agriculture, 1919 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), p. $17.
$Hawk, op. cit., pp. 113-llh.

Figure 2*

typical Stand of Virgin Longleaf Pine, The forest
floors in this~forest iype were kepi free of shadetolerant hardwoods by frequent burning* There is
little doubt that groundfires are part of the ’’nat
ural" environment of longleaf pine*
Source: Louisiana Department of Conservation,
Seventh Biennial Report, 19 2h - 1926*

Typical stand of virgin langleaf pine.
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ing and soap making.
The sale of select timber and light transportable products such

as potash helped defray the cost of clearing land, but it did not keep

the endless expanse of sturdy trees from being the major obstacle to

settlement*

Marsh points out that even the primitive Indians found the

forests sterile, contrary to popular belief:
w • • » the history of savage life, as far as it is known
to us, presents man in that condition as inhabiting only the
borders of the forest and the open grounds that skirt the
waters and the woods, and as finding only there the aliments
which make up his daily bread* The villages of the North
American Indians were upon the shores of rivers and lakes,
and their weapons and other relics are found only in the nar
row open ground which they had burned over and cultivated,
or in the margin of the woods around their hamlets. Except
upon the banks of rivers or of lakes, the woods of the in
terior of North America, far from the habitations of man,
are almost destitute of animal life."7

The adjustment of the European settlers to the vast wealth of re

sources which were at first almost worthless because of the distance and
cost of transportation to the European markets, led to a steac^ develop
ment of extensive use of their productive potential, with the emphasis
on lighter, more valuable and transportable products.
Although the European settlers had brought with them different at

titudes toward the use of forest lands, the conditions which existed at
the time of settlement of the United States were to mold an entirely dif

ferent set of values in America which would later affect tremendously the

ways our forest land was utilized.

Marsh comments:

"According to the maxims of English jurisprudence, the
common law consists of general customs so long established that

^Marsh, George P., The Earth as Modified by Human Action (New York:
Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 1877), PP« 3b3*3hh.

12

’the memory of man runneth not to the contrary.’ In other
words, long custom makes law. In new countries, the change
of circumstances creates new customs, and, in time, new law,
without the aid of legislation. Had the American colonists
observed a more sparing economy in the treatment of their
woods, a new code of customary fore st-law would have sprung
up and acquired the force of a statute.*$

Though the early destruction of our forests by the torch of the
settler may be lamented, it was the only approach feasible at the time.

What affected the utilization of our forest resources far more than the
early depredations of the woods by the settlers is that the traditions

and customs which developed from this period were to influence forestiy
practices long after the conditions which created them existed.

Four industries were carried on along with the woods-clearing ac
tivities of the settlers in the South.

Hie first of these, the raising

of tobacco, depended on the constant clearing of rich virgin lands, their
use for a decade or so, and a gradual abandonment, first to corn and le
gumes and weeds, and then to "old field" pine, loblolly pine (Pinus

taeda).

Hiis practice spread across Virginia into northern North Carolina

and characterized southern agriculture for the two succeeding centuries.

The second of these industries was made possible by the relatively

mild winter climate in the South which
out supplementary winter feeding.

enabled livestock to survive with

In the Carolinas, hogs, sheep and

cattle were raised in the same extensive way that farming was carried out.

These animals were allowed to run free in the woods, being brought in at
night in some areas.

Pickled beef and salt pork were exported in quantity

to the West Indies, particularly the British colonies of Jamaica and Barba
dos.

An English observer in 1731 was shocked at the complete lack of

6Ibid., p. 326.
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shelter and winter feed given livestock in the South,

and was unable

to grasp an economy which was built on exploiting the productive poten

tial of the country, spreading human effort as extensively as possible*
The ruining of stock in the woods and the customary late winter

grazing-improvement fire became a fixed part of the southern environment,

and may be characterized as part of the environment wherever settlement
spread across the South.

The effect of ground fire on a pine forest is

an involved question, but of major significance are the facts that
healthy trees of sapling size are sufficiently well insulated by thick

bark to be protected against serious injury from ordinary winter ground
fires.

However, small seedlings are killed and reproduction is thereby

prevented®

The exception to these generalizations is longleaf pine

(Pinus palustris) which is immune from light fires as early as the second

year because of a heavy taproot which gives it great recuperative powers
after defoliation and a heavy protective bark and mat of needles which

protect the bud.

However, unlike loblolly and shortleaf (Pinus echinata)

pines, the taproot of the longleaf is eaten by hogs.

As a result, pine

stands which are subject to winter-grazing improvement fires and hogs

will have only scattered reproduction over long periods of time.
The third forest industry of the Atlantic Seaboard which influenced

the southern attitude toward the forest was the high-grade lumber business.

The presence of magnificent specimens of white oak and longleaf pine close
to cheap water transportation combined with the expansion of British ship

ping during the seventeenth century and the near exhaustion of British

domestic supplies of large oaks for basic heavy ship timbers to create an

9
Bogart and Thompson, op. cit., pp. 140-411.

u
export market for ship-building products from the southern colonies*
Early colonial exports to England included masts, shingles, spars, tim
bers, clapboards, staves, headings, and hoops.^0

The strength, rot resistance and availability in long, clean timbers
of southern longleaf pine along the coasts of the Carolinas and Georgia
brought logging in connection with ship-building exports, but on a limited

and highly selective basis, with only the very best and largest trees,

or small, clean mast material being taken*

With the development of an

American ship-building industry in New England, the utilisation of
southern trees became more extensive, but apparently no less specialized*

During the first half of the nineteenth century, logging in the
South began expanding, as evidenced by the increase in the number of saw
mills in Virginia from 112 to 779 between 1810 and 1860*^

A Maine or

ganization in 183h bought up 700,000 acres of timber land in Georgia and

in that year began operating four sawmills and eighteen saws in the neigh12

borhood of Savannah*

In 1828 reservations of timber for use by the United States Navy
were established on Commissioners, Cypress, and Six islands, Louisiana*
These reservations reflect the earliest national concern for the exhaustiI
bility of timber resources within the economic reach of the ship-building

Kawk, op* cit*, p. 112.
^Ibid., p. 279.

12Ibid.

"Fernow, Bernhard E., History of Forestry (Toronto: University Press,
1907), p. U02.
----------

Figure 3.

Virgin Lpngleaf Pine Scorched By Fire.
The severe
scorching illustrated here raises the question as
to the adequacy of light, prescribed burning to
achieve the level of hardwood control found in vir
gin stands.
Source: Charles Mohr, The Timber Pines of the
Southern United States XO. Department oT Agricul
ture Division of Forestry Bulletin No. 13, Rev. Ed.,
1897), P. 26.

Figure It.

Longleaf Pine Forest After Removal of Merchantable
Timber* This picture illustrates tHe effect of premdus tri al logging • Only those trees were cut which
+2^^ provide dimension material. The broad axe and
the ox team were the only essential capital goods for
this type of logging.
Source: Charles Mohr, The Timber Pines of the Southern
United States, p. 26.--------------------------------- -
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industry*

However, the character of this exhaustion was of selective

species and prime trees*
The change from high-grade logging to industrial logging in the

South did not occur until the 188O»s*

The significance of the high

grade logging was that it did not destroy the forest as an active grow^
ing unit even after this type of logging had been carried on for as long

as two centuries*

Although the running of cattle and hogs in the woods

and the custom of winter burning hampered reproduction, the seed supply
was such that reproduction did occur, though with certain changes in
species composition such as the replacement of longleaf by loblolly
pine over a period of years*

The result was that there was no problem

or custom developed in the economy of the South for the use of cutover
lends since the problem had not existed until industrial logging came

south from the Lake States*
The Naval-Stores Industry

This industry received its name and initial importance as the devel
opment of commerce in wooden ships became a key factor in national power

relations in Europe, both economically and as a reserve of naval power*
From the earliest American settlements, naval stores were recognized as
a vital resource as a preservative for timber and cordage and as water

proofing material*

Tar burning was the first practice to spread through the colonies*

This involved the burning of the naturally fallen trees in the pine forests
in improvised charcoal pits, or merely retarding their burning, and making
provision to catch the pitch that oozed from the slowly burning logs or

that accumulated in the bottom of the charcoal pit*"^

This was an exten-

l^ard, Jay, "Naval Stores: The Industry," Yearbook of Agriculture,
19^9 (Washington, D»C*: U*S* Government Printing office), p* 286*

Figure 5,

Turpentine Orcharding in Louisiana, The box, or
cavity cut into the tree trunk to catch the ooze
fi’om the wounded tree would extend 7 inches into
the heart of the tree, h inches wide, and hold
from 3 cups to a quart. Smaller trees were weak
ened by such treatment and fell in windstorms.
The turpentine face also invited fire damage and
insect attacks after the orchard was abandoned.
Source: Charles Mohr, The Timber Pines of the
Southern United States, p, £77
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sive woods use and parallels the present wood naval-stores industzy
which relies on mill residues and old stumps left after logging.

“When

the pitch and turpentine content of the longleaf was recognized, the

practice of bleeding or tapping living trees for turpentine and tar de
veloped.

As early as 1700 naval stores was the second most valuable in-

15
dustry in Virginia, and in Maryland was second only to tobacco.

The

industry spread rapidly through the longleaf flatwoods of North Carolina
and developed along with stock raising and selective logging,

North

Carolina was the nation»s leading producer of naval-stores products until

16
1850.
This early combination of stock raising, turpentining, and high

grade logging suggests a relatively stable pattern of land use applied

to the longleaf pine stands.

Selective logging opened up the stands

and incidentally stimulated growth, and the turpentiner and stock man

made joint use of the woods.
The gradual increase in the value of timber close to the coast, the

high mortality rate among young trees resulting from the crude "boxing"

method of tapping, and the replacement of longleaf by loblolly pine as
a result of the running of hogs, combined to gradually limit the naval-

stores production in its original areas of the South.

This, combined

with the advance in American ship-building and the demand for turpentine

oil, led the turpentiners to move through
bleeding the virgin trees relentlessly
ing logging business.

^Hawk, op. cit., p. 113e
16tfard,

og. cit., p. 28?.

Georgia,Alabama

as theymoved

andFlorida,

ahead ofthe

expand
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In I83Z4 the development of better distilling techniques and the

subsequent use of turpentine oil as an illuminant (camphene)

led to

a pell-mell expansion of the industry and the abandonment of any stable

long-term use of the pine forests as the "chippers” moved out from
Mobile Bay and into ■western Mississippi deep into virgin stands inac

cessible to lumbermen where the cost of transportation forced them to

leave the rosin in the woods.

18

The heavy, high-quality yield of "virgin dip" during the first

three years of tapping led to an overproduction and a price break in
The substitution of kerosene for turpentine oil and the dis

18Uu

ruption of the Civil War almost finished the industry until a new crop

of industrial uses grew up with the introduction of iron ships and the
development of the chemical industry.
The point of real importance is that the turpentine industry as a

stable land form never reached Louisiana, and even in its industrial ex
pansion got little beyond Alabama.

The speed with which the virgin

stands of longleaf were cut in Louisiana under industrial logging

methods was chiefly responsible for the failure of a naval-stores indus
try to develop in the state.

Also, the industry had not recovered suf

ficiently from the fall in the market before the Civil War to permit its
expansion outside of the areas where it was established, except for

sporadic tapping just before logging.
The naval-storeb industry, therefore, did not exercise a significant
influence in Louisiana toward using methods of logging which would have

I?Hawk, og. cit., p. 280.

18

Mohr, Charles, The Timber Pines of the Southern United States
(U.S. Department of Agriculture Division o7^res try Mle'tin No. 15,
Rev. Ed., 1897b PP. 62-72.
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made possible a sustained use of forest land*
This, then, was the pattern of forest resource use in the south

eastern states before the arrival of industrial logging:

a joint use

of the forests by the turpentiner, the stockman, and the high-grade
logger*

These industries had developed before the mechanization of log

ging equipment, and even after industrial logging became established in
these states the joint forest industries must have influenced the utili

zation of the forest resource.

It will be seen that the speed with

which industrial logging moved through the virgin forests of Louisiana
prevented the joint land-use system of the southeastern states from

getting a foothold in the state*
The Southern Development of Industrial Logging

"First Maine, then New York, and then Pennsylvania led
the states in lumber production. In the vast pineries sur
rounding the Great Lakes, following the War between the
States, lumber manufacture took the form which molded its
destinies* It became the great nomad among American indus
tries, driving from one virgin forest to another like a
threshing machine from one ripe wheat field to the next."
n* • *Early in the eighties, lumber capital from Michigan
and Wisconsin began to flow into the nearest virgin fields —
the southern pineries*
The South entered its period of ac
tive timber buying, speculation, and the blocking up of
large holdings* Many tracts of state timber, public lands,
and private patents were brought (sic) up, much of it at
$l*2f> per acre* In the following twenty years, company
after company cut out in the North, junked the old plant,
and trekked with its group of skilled hands to a new loca
tion in Mississippi or Louisiana.^?

The Lake States story was largely repeated in Louisiana where the

pine forests had scarcely been touched when industrial logging arrived*

^Greeley, William B*, Forests and Men (Garden City, N*Y*: Doubleday

& Co*, Inc*, 1951), p* 1|2«
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Valuable timber land as late as 1691 was being sold at $U2£ per acre*

Some of the speculators accumulated land in blocks of hundreds of

thousands of acres*

20

Although much of the valuable land had been sold

by 1908, even at that time forested public lands in Louisiana were ba-

ing sold to the highest bidder at the following rates per acre:
Untimbered
Cypress
Pine
Hardwoods
Dry lake
Prairie
Sea marsh

21

e 2.5o
10.00
8.00
8*00
3.00
10.00
• 25

The lumber industry in its migration from the Lake States to the

South in the 1880 ’ s brought with it, along with physical equipment and
capital, value judgments which had become institutionalized in the Lake
States*

Since the destruction of the timber had always been the necessary
prerequisite to agricultural development, the lumber industry had not
yet adjusted to the problem of non-agricultural timber land.

The credit structure of the industry at the time of its arrival in
the South was itself predicated on the availability of another virgin

stand to which to move when the stand then being cut was finished*

With

the vast expansion on credit and the heavy obligations to be met an

nually carrying six to eight per cent interest, it was cheaper to

operate at a profit level which at least covered part of the overhead
than to close down completely and let the overhead eat up the value of

20

Foster, J. H., Forest Conditions in Louisiana (U.S. Department of
Agriculture Forest Service Bulletin llb,”T912), p. 8.

21Ibid*, p. 7.
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the mill#

Foster reported that as much as $2 had to go to meet bonded

debt out of every thousand feet of lumber sawed by many of the operators
in Louisiana in 1908-1910, with lumber selling at $12,0$ per thousand
board feet on a market which had broken in 1907*

Some of the mills in

Louisiana, according to Foster, were even running day and night to meet

credit obligations#

The slogan of the industry and the requirement for

survival of the over-expanded companies as expressed by a Minnesota
lumberman was:

"Keep your saw in a log and sell at the market#"

23

The Copeland Report in 1933 summarised the past financial difficul
ties of the lumber industry as follows:
"Overproduction • • • grows in part out of an overhead
of stumpage and forest land, the consequent financial pres
sure to liquidate, the development of excessive plant capacity,
and the burden of high and largely fixed and inescapable capi
tal costs. Manufacturers have accordingly believed that they
would lose less money by running than by shutting down# Un
economic manufacture, overproduction, and demoralized prices
have been the inevitable outcome#"

Hardtner, as chairman of the Louisiana Conservation Commission, put

it flatly to the Yellow Pine Manufacturers Association in a speech in

1911 that if the loggers didn’t stop leaving 2,000 board feet per acre

of second-grade logs lying on the ground in the woods after logging, the
state would have to take measures similar to those already taken to pre-

22

Foster, op# cit#, p. 2U*

^Greeley, op# cit#, p# h2»

National Plan for American Forestry, Vol# 1, Document No# 12,
73d Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C#: U.S# Government Printing
Office, 1933), p. 1$.
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vent waste of natural gas.

2*3

Getting the timber cut, sawed and sold was as far as the majority

of the lumbermen were willing or able to go*

The possible shortage of

the timber supply (not only for the nation, but for their own operations)

was of little moment*
The possibility of growing timber for a second cut after the first

siege on the virgin forests was not envisioned by the industry generally

As a member of Gifford Pinchot’s Forest Service staff,

at this time.

William B. Greeley and others

undertook a survey by questionnaire in

about 1911 to determine the status of current timber cutting practices.
The final question read:

"What provision do you make for reproduction?”

Greeley reported that most of the lumbermen left this question blank,

but one wrote in:

"Nothing of the kind allowed in my camps,” and this

26
reply fairly summarized the situation.“
In the wake of industrial logging in Louisiana were left the cutover

lands, a burden on the lumber industry and the state alike.

By 1918 it

was estimated that there were over 12,260,000 acres of cutover land in

the state, and that it was increasing at the rate of 2^0,000 to 300,000
acres yearly.

27

nt
^Hardtner, Henry, "Conservation in Louisiana," speech delivered
January 18, 1911 before the Yellow Pine Manufacturers Association, New
Orleans, Louisiana. The Copeland Report estimated that as late as 1926
similar waste in the Douglas-fir region amounted to over one-sixth of the
cut for that year.
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Greeley, og. cit«, pp. 116-117.

"^Louisiana department of Conservation, Fourth Biennial Report,
1918 - 1920, p. Ii3.
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The credit structure of the industry and the cutover-land problem

will be discussed in more detail in a later part of this study*

The

point here is that since Louisiana’s pine forests had hardly been
touched prior to the coming of industrial logging to the state, the ar

rival of the industry at this point in the development of the state’s
economy led to its growing in an entirely different tradition than that

developed in the Atlantic Seaboard states with the practices of joint
land use by the cattleman, the turpentiner, and the selective logger*

It was full-blown industrial logging unrelated to the land-use traditions
of the Carolinas, Georgia, Florida, and parts of Alabama and Mississippi*
While cotton cropping and field abandonment, and wild hogs and fire in

the woods were customs carried to Louisiana by settlers as part of a
land-use form tied to climate and social traditions, these practices did

not develop as a part of the logging tradition in the state and their
application to industrially logged lands had a different significance*

The traditions were the same, but the environment to which they were ap
plied was entirely different.
It was in this setting that Louisiana was being logged in the 1890’s

and early 1900’s and it was in this period that Henry Hardtner developed
his views and made his economic decisions.
The Influence of German Forestry
The contribution made by examples and individuals from Europe in

the latter nineteenth century founded the science of forestry in the
United States.

The situation can best be indicated by the long divergence

between forestry, or the science and arts of production, as opposed to

lumbering, the business of cutting and selling.
While England had developed an import trade before her economy was

25

brought around to widespread forestry measures as important aspects of

the nation’s development, Germany and France had distinct experiences
which give us a clearer understanding of the forestry issue in the

United States at the turn of the century.

Germany began extensive formal emphasis on forestry as an abstract
study in the eighteenth century.

The Kameralist tradition among the

German states and the nationalist trends which emphasized resource de*

velopment, making it the concern of the nation to foster both industrial
and agricultural progress, inevitably had their effects on forestry.
Through the nineteenth century the customary management of forests be

came the object of formal study on the university level by men trained
and educated in the von Humboldt tradition with an orientation in the
German version of political economy or statesmanship*

By 1800 extensive planting was being developed, mainly with forestgrown seedlings, and by 18U0 the basic techniques of today, using nursery

28
stock, thinning, and cutting practices, were well established.

The ad

vanced state of all the life sciences in Germany through this period

culminated in applied fields yielding well-orientated scientific devel
opment.

This early development had two important influences.

First,

the large numbers of German immigrants arriving in the Itoi ted States
brought a consciousness of the exhaustibility of forests and the poten
tiality of the economic validity of frugal use as well as some considera

tion of reforestation.

Since Germany had just finished two centuries

of development toward the recognition of forests as a valuable and des true table resource, one can expect that German immigrants must have had

28

Fernow, op* cit., pp. 59-68.
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a fairly uniform reaction to American forest practices of the timet
Their impact on the American scene seems to have been small, however*

Secondly, German-trained scientists in the field of forestry found

their way into positions of influence in the United States as the gov
ernment began to concern itself with an understanding of the forest in

dustries*

B. E. Fernow, Carl Schenck, and the botanist, Charles Mohr,

among others, represented German forestry in the founding of the study

of American forest problems.

Although Gifford Pinchot was trained in

France, German science dominated the continent.

Charles Mohr’s work in

the South on the southern pines, with his base at Alexandria, Louisiana,

between 1880 and 1883, tempts one to speculate upon the role of personal
contacts in that area on both the Hardtner family and the tendency for

conservation legislation in Louisiana to spring from that area.
The French development represents a different type of forestry back

ground much more meaningful to a virgin country like the United States,
convinced by custom as well as price relations that scientific tree pro
duction was an old-world fallacy.

After 1789, vast areas of forested mountains in France were re

leased from the protection of the languishing French feudal system and
the surging industrial development, stimulated by the Napoleonic Wars,
led to a serious erosion and flood problem following so immediately upon

the heels of denudation that government attention was mandatory and clear

cut recognition of the cause was unavoidable.

The devastation caused by

only ten to twenty years of irresponsible logging took almost a century
to arrest.

With mountain watershed-control projects and later the Landes

Dune-Control Project started under Louis Napoleon, German science was ap
plied in a way which emphasised national values and protection against
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great loss rather than profit*

The concern in the early conservation literature in the United

States for flood control, watershed protection, and climatic influences
of forests was responsible for the New fork Adirondack forest-reserve
program of the 1880’s*

By 1890 the Landes dune reclamation program in France was showing

signs of being economically profitable from the point of view of private

investments

The role of this vast reforestation program in the popular

imagination leads one to expect that it would have received attention

at the Paris Exposition of 1900, which was attended by Henry Hardtner’s
father*

CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HARDTNER TIMBER INVESTMENTS

Henry Ernest Hardtner was born in Pineville, Louisiana, in 1871*
His father, E. J® Hardtner, had come from Germany in 1865®

He first

visited the Pineville area in 1867 and settled there permanently in
1869.

Henry Hardtner’s career began in 1892 when at 21 years of age he

invested $1,000 his father had given him in a local sawmill venture,
with his father and J. M® Nugent holding the remainder of the $6,000
capital.

Hardtner served as a member of the board of directors, man

ager of commissary and secretary and treasurer of NugentrHardtner & Co®,
Ltd.
In 1896, having gained the basic experience and capital, Hardtner

entered a partnership with Charles W® Lacroix®

A sawmill with a small

amount of timber was purchased from John Q. prestridge at Maxwell Spur,
Louisiana, on the Iron Mountain Railroad®

The business was operated

under the name of Hardtner and Lacroix with a cash capital of about

$3,000.

Biographical information on E. J® Hardtner and the early beginnings
of the Hardtner investments are taken largely from the following docu
ments: "Biography of E. J® Hardtner," (an autobiography), undated mimeo
graphed pamphlet in the writer’s possession® Copies of this document are
also on file in the office of the Urania Lumber Company® Another source
of information is an application by the Urania Lumber Company to the WhitneyCentral Trust & Savings Bank, New Orleans, 1910, for a loan of $700,000,
which outlines the early history of the company. This document is on
file in the office of the Urania Lumber Company also®
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Figure 6.

nI was born in the forests and have had close
association with them since childhood* What I
know of them cannot be learned in schools or
colleges.
To me they are as humans and I know
the trees as I try to know men*w

- Henry E. Hardtner
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Hardtner renamed the town site Urania after the Greek muse of as
tronomy, saying ”it was like moving from hell to heaven.1^

The naming

of the town Urania seems to indicate more than the fancy of a young
man with a literary bent*

It suggests that even then Hardtner had the

feeling that a stable community could be organized around the timberlands

which were then being cut over, burned over, and left to ihe hogs and
the tax assessors.

The ”hell” Hardtner referred to was the usual raw,

brawling, lumber boom towns.
After two years, in 1898, the small tract of virgin timber which

had been purchased with the mill had been cut over.

A tract of 3,158

acres of virgin timber was purchased from Attwood Violet of New York,

situated eight miles north of Urania in Caldwell Parish, for $13,500
cash.

The sawmill which Hardtner and Lacroix then owned was valued at

$5,000 and the partnership had $5,000 in cash.

Hardtner’s father and

William Edenborn invested an additional $5,000 each in the new venture.

The first operation of Urania Lumber Company, Ltd., with Henry Hardtner

as its president, was to build a railroad to the new tract of timber,
logging small stands and "picking up stumpage at 50? per M feet to keep
the mill running."

After three years, the main body of timber was

reached and a new sawmill was erected at Urania with a capacity of 60,000

feet per day.

^Kerr, Ed, ”1600 People and No Jail|,” Forests & People, III (1953),

11.
^William B. Greeley in Forests and Men (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday&
& Co., Inc., 1951, p* 111) gives this description of the early lumber towns:
"Twenty years, and even less, became the common lifetime of a sawmill.
Then—dismantle, junk and move on. Not only did lumbering become a nomadic
industry; it became an industry with no permanent interest in the land. A
logged-off section was in the same category as a junked mill—to be sold
for what it might bring, or abandoned and forgotten.
Hence forest fires
were of small moment until they threatened merchantable timber or a logging
camp.”
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Hardtner’s father stated that before 1906 his investments in Urania
Lumber Company had yielded 85% of his investment in cash dividends and

100% in stock dividends.

In 1906 he sold 90 of his 100 shares in the

company to his son for $35,000.

Henry Hardtner also bought 20 shares

from Walter Tisdale for $3,000 and the company bought out Lacroix’s
interest for $35,000.

Q. T. Hardtner, Henry Hardtner’s younger brother,

also held a minor interest in the company at this time.

During the

same year the stock of Urania Lumber Company was increased to $200,000
and paid as stock dividends.

Aside from cash dividends paid between

1898 and 1906, this increase in value of the company’s assets represents
roughly a 30% compounded rate of reinvestment out of profits.

It is impossible to be sure to what degree these moves represented
a difference of agreement among the investors, but as early as 190b and

1905 Hardtner had begun buying cutover tracts at $1.00 per acre with a
definite opinion of their reforestation potential, and at a time when
fifteen years separated him from the pioneers of southern reforestation
and twenty-five from its general respectability©^
During this period of rising prices before 1907, Hardtner took an

active part in local affairs in the community, working for the division

of Catahoula Parish which later resulted in the creation of LaSalle Parish

^Greeley (op© cit., p. 69) stated:

”None of us, foresters or lumbermen,

had as yet (in 1^20) any conception of the reproductive power of the loggedover forests, especially in the South, or how the growth rate was increasing
as young trees replaced old timber.”
$John S. Kyser ("The Evolution of Louisiana Parishes in Relation to

Population Growth and Movement,” unpublished dissertation, Louisiana State
University, 1938, p© 193) said of the division of Catahoula Parish: "The
hill area of LaSalle was feeling the full swing of the pine lumber industry,
and this had little in common with the major portion of what is now Cata
houla.”

32

in which Urania is now situated.
In 1908 President Theodore Roosevelt called his Governors* Confer
ence to discuss conservation problems.

The meeting was held May 13*15

at Washington, D. C., and Hardtner attended as a representative of
Louisiana.
Hardtner was elected to the Louisiana Legislature and served in
the session of 1910 where he was appointed Chairman of the House Com

mittee on Conservation set up by House Resolution No. 1 which he had

introduced on May 12, 1910.

During this session of the legislature

Hardtner succeeded in obtaining the passage of Act 172.

This act estab

lished a Louisiana Commission of Conservation, giving life to Act llf4 of

1908 which had established a Commission on Natural Resources with a twoyear assignment of reporting on conditions throughout the state.

Act

144 had been inspired by Roosevelt’s Governors* Conference and had been

introduced by Representative Thornton of Alexandria, possibly under
Hardtner’s guidance.
In addition to basic wildlife conservation legislation, Hardtner

also introduced Act 261 which set up the Division of Forestry in the Con

servation Commission and contained the provisions for the reforestation
contracts.

Act 261 supplanted Act 113 of 1904, which had dealt only

generally with fire prevention and reforestation and had lain idle on

the statute books.
Important aspects of Hardtner’s plans are documented for the years
1909 and 1914*

Reports to the U. S. Forest Service on Urania lands were
6

made in these years, the first in 1909 by W. W. Ashe

and the second in

^Ashe, W. W., "Report of the Forest Lands of the Urania Lumber Com
pany, Catahoula Parish, Louisiana," unpublished report to the U.S. Forest
Service, June, 1919. On file at Urania Lumber Company.
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1914 by W. R* Mattoon#

7

Ashe was sent to Urania by Chief Forester Gifford Pinchot of the
U. S. Forest Service in response to Hardtner* s request for advice from
8

the Forest Service in 1909*

Ashe set forth the information Hardtner

wanted from the Forest Service as follows:

"The owners desire to ascertain (1) the rate of growth
of the small trees left on the cut over lands; (2) whether
it will be profitable to replant portions of this land
where there is now no small timber and the natural restock
ing is imoerfect; (3) whether it will be profitable in
future lumbering to set a diameter limit for cutting trees
or to continue to cut clean*"^
At the conclusion of his report Ashe commented:

"Fires must be stopped before
It is useless to either plant
seed trees in order to obtain
the young growth is protected

reproduction can be secured*
cut over lands or to leave
natural reproduction unless
from fires."

According to Ashe’s report, Hardtner at this time had accumulated

a total of about 20,000 acres, about 12,000 of which had been cut over*

Ashe estimated that 80 per cent of the land was longleaf pine, 1$ per
cent shortleaf pine, and 5 per cent or less loblolly pine*

The lands

were located in Caldwell, Catahoula, and Winn parishes and lay to the
north and northwest of Urania on both sides of the Iron Mountain Rail-

7
Mattoon, W* R*, "Report on Investigated Projects for the Urania
Lumber Company Forests in Cooperation with the Louisiana Conservation
Commission," unpublished report to the U.S* Forest Service, January 22,
1914 > On file at Urania Lumber Company*
o

°Brief History of Conservation in Louisiana, undated pamphlet on
file in the office oT~the Louisiana Forestry Commission, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana. It is believed to have been published privately by the
Urania Lumber Company*
o

Ashe, "Report of the Forest Lands of the Urania Lumber Company,
Catahoula Parish, Louisiana," p* 2*
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road, and were part of the tract which was later included in Refores
tation Contract No* !•

Ashe was skeptical of the possibilities of natural regeneration

on most of the land and emphasized the necessity of planting for re
forestation,
"The conditions which determine a permanent forest invest
ment on the land of Urania Lumber Co# are most favorable on
the loblolly pine land and least favorable on the longleaf
pine lands# The loblolly pine land, including the lands
which are suitable for planting with this species, offer a
5 per cent investment at the present prices of stumpage#
The longleaf pine lands which must be artificially restocked,
offer a 5 per cent investment only In the event of stumpage
attaining a value of $8^50 per M feet by 197O#"10
Mattoon was more optimistic concerning the possibilities of na

tural regeneration in his report in 191h:
"A very heavy crop of Long Leaf Pine in 1913, which, accom
panied by warm weather in November, resulted in splendid seed
germination# By early December Long Leaf Seedlings were
present in great abundance near practically all Long Leaf
trees of seed bearing age.
This means that large areas for
which artificial reforestation had been considered necessary
are now well restocked#"

Even though Mattoon reported longleaf regeneration on difficult
areas, he outlined Hardtner1s program as follows:

"He is working toward developing a normal forest representing
all ages in a cutting rotation of hO to 60 years for short
leaf and loblolly pines# The aim is to have a continuous
yield (of possibly about 15 million board feet annually) from
the tract. The company has for some time been purchasing
wornout homestead lands and cut-over tracts of young pine
lying within or near their main body of land#"
Hardtner’s land had been under reforestation contract for nearly a

year when Mattoon saw it and Hardtner apparently felt that planting for

reforestation was not necessary in order to comply with the terms of the

^Ibid., pp. 5-6.

Mattoon reports.

Italics mine in excerpts from the Ashe and
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contract®

He was convinced that fire prevention would allow an ade

quate stand of seedling shortleaf and loblolly pines to reach a size
where they would not be completely wiped out by occasional fires*

Also, he was on some lands, following the principle of careful logging,
leaving enough small and growing timber undamaged and free from burning

over so as to provide a second commercial saw-timber cut in a few years*
Of most significance in Mattoon’s report is his statement that
Hardtner was planning for a hO to 60 year cutting rotation on his lands*
A review of the current literature of the time shows Hardtner’s under

standing of the growth potential of pines and the practicality of plan

ning for a crop of timber far in advance of many of the outstanding
foresters of his day*
H* H<» Chapman of the Yale School of Forestry was recommending man

agement for a 20-year second cut for virgin stands of longleaf pine in

Texas in 1909*

While he pointed out in a study on shortleaf and lob

lolly pines in Arkansas in 1912 that a second cut program could result

in a by-product stand of five-inch saplings at final cutting, he ques
tioned the economic feasibility of management for sustained yield of

second growth timber*

12

Carl Schenck, founder of the first forestry

school in the United States, had the same opinion after studying in Ala-

bama in the late 1890’s*

13

.
Ashe also did not view second-growth timber

'^Chapman, H* H*, "An Experiment in Logging Longleaf Pine," Forest

Quarterly, VII (1909), 385.

------

12Chapman, H. H< and Ralph C. Bryant, Prolonging the Cut of Southern
Pine, Yale Forest School Bulletin 2, April, 1913, pp*

^Schenck, Carl A*, The Biltmore Story (St. Paul, Minn*: Minnesota
Historical Society, 1955), p. 86*
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as productive enough to make a good investment, although he was aware

that the North Carolina lumbering during the first decade of the twen
tieth century was about halfway through a second-growth fire and old-

14
field sub-climax of loblolly pine ranging from 100 to 150 years of age*

Glenn Tannehill, forester for the Urania Lumber Company since 1942,
stated that the notations which Hardtner made on the company records of

small plots of cutover land purchased in 1904 and 1905 give remarkably

accurate anticipation of the stands in forty years#

15

Ashe in his 1909 report to the Forest Service on Urania lands in
cluded growth rate charts on individual trees before and after logging

of the area.

While his figures indicate that the growth rate during

the ten years after logging tended to be double that during the ten years
previous to logging on loblolly pine, he was apparently dealing with re
leased trees and his three-inch increment in ten years was not applied
in terms of a stand or yield per acre*

His North Carolina study indi

cated that he found second-growth stands crowded and slow growing*
Ashe1 s estimate that the growth rate on loblolly pine in bottomlands on

Urania lands would yield a 5 per cent return and that longleaf would
yield an equal return if stumpage prices should rise to $8*50 by 1970

would not have encouraged Hardtner when credit in the form of timber bonds

would cost him at least 6 per cent interest*

Eardtner had built in 1901 a mill designed to handle 60,000 board

feet of lumber per day, or 15 million board feet a year, and he was sys-

^Ashe, W* w*, Loblolly or North Carolina Pipe, North Carolina

Geological and Economic Survey, Bullstin No*

^Interview with the writer*

1914, p* 10*
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■hematically accumulating cutover land designed to provide an annual

yield equal to the mill’s capacity.

When he attempted to obtain $700,000 credit in 1910, he contem
plated acquiring a vast tract of virgin timber and building a second

mill in Winn Parish north of Urania.

This lends credence to the idea

that he still considered the object of his enterprise to be the main

tenance of a stable mill based on enough land within easy reach to
fill its annual timber requirements.

The second mill was never built

at Winnfield, but he did acquire additional stretches of timber.

Our

assumption must be that when Hardtner gave up his plans of a second

mill at Winnfield and the acquisition of new tracts of virgin timber,
he followed his father’s example and retrenched in what he considered
a sound investment; that is, a mill at Urania running at 15 million

board feet per year capacity with an assured supply of timber from

second-growth forest lands.

According to Q. T. Hardtner, Jr., present president of the com
pany, the Urania mill was operating on the basis of sustained yield on

16
company lands by 1917•

Having laid the groundwork for a stable mill at Urania, Hardtner’s
energy and understanding of problems of lumbering led him to intensity
his conservation activities.

As Chairman of the Commission on Natural

Resources (1906-1910) and Chairman of the Conservation Commission (1910
1912), he travelled extensively over the state familiarizing himself

with forest conditions.

Both in his capacity as a state official and as

a private citizen, he missed no opportunity to make speeches explaining

16

Interview with the writer.
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his ideas on conservation and forestry.

17

18
The Pally Picayune for May 13> 1913, reported a rumor that Hardt

ner represented interests that would shortly put 200,000 to 300,000
acres of cutover land under reforestation contract*

The Picayune stated

that the owners of these lands were waiting ”to see whether the state’s
proposition was agreeable or too binding.”
The reason such large-scale contracts did not follow was because

no one except Hardtner really believed that reforesting cutover lands

was a profitable private business venture.

The contract made with

Urania Lumber Company shows clearly that the state was primarily con

cerned with the popular issues of reforestation as a means of flood con
trol and the climatic influence of denudation, and while the contract

alluded to possible financial aid being forthcoming on this basis, the

only real concession was the long-term freezing of the tax evaluation on
contract lands.

Since the market value of these lands was no higher

than the contract’s valuation of $1*00 per acre and was not expected to
rise much above that sum, the only reason for a landowner to bind him

self to maintain fire protection and fire wardens, and to follow the
Conservation Commission’s reforestation ideas, was the positive belief
that within a short time a stand of second-growth timber on the lands

would raise its value to such a point that the low tax evaluation would

17
’Though most of his speeches contained stern warnings to his fellow
lumbermen of the wastefulness of the industry, Hardtner’s sense of humor
was well known. One of his speeches was entitled, "The Tale of a Root
and the Root of a Tail, Or Root Hog or Die*"
18

Reforestation Contract No. 1 was signed on July UU, 1913 but was
made retroactive to January 1, 1913. Hardtner had applied for a contract
on September 23, 1912*
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become an economic boon.

This was an assumption that most of the

foresters of the day and the owners of Louisiana’s cutover lands were

obviously unwilling to make on a private economic basis, and without
a cost-covering stipend, they were uninterested#

As early as 190? the Southern Lumber Operators’ Association was

formed, but this apparently was not in response to President Roosevelt’s

conservation ideas but a product of the growing size of the southern
lumber industry and its common industrial problems, not the least of
which was the widespread labor unrest in Louisiana and Texas among saw-

19

mill and woods workers during that year#

Most conservation work and forestry of the day were tied to prob
lems and plans for state forestry, or efficiency in utilization of vir

gin stands.

Carl Schenck felt that his attempts at bringing forestry

to private industry were a failure as a general rule.

20

Fernow as early

as 1892 had brought the benefit of bis broad German education to bear on
the problem, and applied classical economic concepts of the market.

He

took the consistent position that the individual could not participate

in the timber industry in the South at a level of forest policy designed
for sustained yield when the market was set by those mining the virgin
timber and not contributing preparation for the future as a cost of pro-

4.4 21
duction#
—
zMcWhiney, H# Grady, "The Socialist Vote in Louisiana, 1912: An His
torical Interpretation of Radical Sources,” unpublished thesis, Louisiana
State University, 1952. Although McWhiney’s study is mainly devoted to
labor unrest in Louisiana sawmill towns, he does not mention Urania Lumber
Company#
20
Schenck, op# cit», p. 202.
21
Rodgers, Andrew D«, Bernhard Eduard Fernow (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1951), pp. 193-19^1

to
As late as 1917, Fernow still felt that until the lumber industry

as a whole accepted forest regeneration as a cost of production below
which it could not do business, the only hope of scientific forestry
was through government acquisition for Joint purposes of watershed pro
tection and recreation combined with reforestation for future timber
22
production*

This was the basis upon which Greeley felt that the lumber industry

in 1917 was a sick, unhealthy one, forced by its credit structure and
competition and overhead to mine the forests as long as virgin timber

was present, while Gifford Pinchot blamed the industry as a willful one*

23

In the light of these views, it is not surprising that in the ab
sence of extra financial inducements, cutover land holders in Louisiana

were not willing to attempt fire protection and reforestation, however
inexpensive these measures might be*

Nor is it surprising that as late

as 1917, according to Heyward, w* • • Hardtner was generally conceded to
be a visionary and an eccentric because of his claim that his efforts to
2^
grow a second generation of pine trees was succeedinge”

Four years after Hardtner had staked the future of his cutover lands

on reforestation, representatives of the southern lumber industry met in
New Orleans at the Cutover Land Conference of the South to face the criti
cal economic problem of what could be done with cutover lands*

22
23

This con*

Ibid*, p. 580*
Greeley, op* cit*, p. 118.

2)
“Heyward, Frank, "Austin Caiy, Yankee Peddler in Forestry," American
Forests, LXI (1955), 28.
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Terence will be dealt with in more detail at a later point in this
study, but suffice it to say here that reforestation of the cutover

lands was not seriously considered by the lumbermen as a solution to
their problem.

The blossoming of industrial logging with mass techniques and de

creasing costs as far as tree selection was concerned led to the de
nuding of forest land in Louisiana.

With almost no trees left for seed

and masses of undisposed slash concentrated, the aftermath of industrial

logging was the traditional southern grazing-improvement fire which

killed even large saplings accidentally left after destructive logging,
and hogs and the annual range fires kept reproduction from re-establish

ing at all in many places.

Hogs destroyed fire-resistant longleaf seed

lings and fire kilied hog-immune shortleaf and loblolly seedlings.

East

of the Mississippi River, slash pine suffered from both scourges*
There was no room left for the auxiliary land use systems of the
South Atlantic states which bad been built up over the years around tur

pentining and grazing of high-graded longleaf stands on lands cut under

a different system than that of industrial logging with its power skidders

and unskilled gang labor*

Turpentining was never developed in Louisiana

to any extent as an auxiliary forest land use, although it had been a
pre-logging industry for a short time*

In 1917, Austin Cary, an ardent defender of laissez faire and ad
vocate of southern forestry said,

"I have advocated opportunistic, catch-as-catch-can
forestry in the main as that which seems to fit our circuit
stances and people, and the kind that, frankly pursued, will
yield most in the long run."2£

~
Cary, Austin, "How Lumbermen in Following Their Own Interests
Served the Public," Journal of Forestry, XV (1917), 289.
'
25

h2

But Henry Hardtner at Urania, Louisiana, had been doing the un
economical, the silviculturally unfeasible for almost ten years and he

did not rely on a long-range view, but on the present.
Hardtner said in 1913 in explanation of why he was putting his cut

over lands under reforestation contract:
’’That I or anyone else will be permitted to destroy
our forests and leave the lands bare and valueless for years
will not be tolerated much longer in any state* We must
either develop them properly or allow the state to do so and when the state takes hold of them, they will fix the
values • . * I am not quite in the millionaire class that
I could afford to be so reckless or generous, nor am I yet
a true philanthropist. I consider it 8 good business inves1>
ment»”2o

^"Reports and Correspondence of Urania State Forest, 1913>" bound
volume of unpublished documents and correspondence on file at Urania
Lumber Company, Urania, Louisiana.

CHAPTER IV

SILVICULTURAL ASPECTS OF THE URANIA REFORESTATION PROGRAM

It is not the purpose of this study to examine in detail the sil

vicultural implications of the forestry program at Urania<

However,

since silvicultural practices naturally influence the economic aspects

of any forestry investment, those of major economic importance will be
discussed briefly as they affected the economic evaluations of Henry
Hardtner#

Fire Protection
Ashe’s report in 190? on Urania lands clearly pointed out that un

less fires were stopped in the woods, it would be impossible for the

pines to restock the cutover lands#

One of the first steps taken by

the Urania Lumber Compariy in complying with its reforestation agreement

with the state, therefore, was to set up a system of fire protection on

the company’s lands#
mission in April,

In his report to the Louisiana Conservation Com

Hardtner reported that the company had fifteen

to twenty fire wardens in the field during the year and had been successful

in preventing serious fires, with not over 700 acres having been burned

over#
Chapman in about 1922 described the changes which the fire protec
tion measures started by Hardtner had made on Urania lands:

"For about twelve years after logging, fires burned

Louisiana Conservation Commission, Report of the Conservation Com
mission of Louisiana, September 1, 1912 -April 17 191h, timber Con
servation Contraci, Urania Lumber Co#, Ltd# and Conservation Commission
of Louisiana,” pp»

H3

annually over this area, destroying all reproduction of
loblolly pine and probably the greeter proportion of long
leaf seedlings « • • Ths tract remained a typical stump
waste similar to the conditions on millions of acres in
the longleaf cutover lands of Louisiana. But, by the
spiring of 1921, after nine years of fire protection, the
entire appearance of this tract had been transformed.
The
loblolly pines now reached a height of from 8 to 20 feet,
and all the gaps had been filled in with more recent seed
lings so that the formerly barren stretches had been con
verted into a thrifty, fully stocked stand of pine saplings,
which in another 5 years will be so large and well protected
by thick bark that they will be practically immune to ordi
nary surface or grass fires burning in the winter or early
spring • • « The great service to forestry in Louisiana
which the demonstration on the Hardtner tract has rendered
is to show the comparative simplicity of the methods neces
sary to secure reproduction of pine timber on cut over lands,
the remarkable abundance and certainty of the resulting re
production and the difference in value of the land, brought
about in just a few years by the practice of these conservation measures*"2

Hardtner understood the possibility of using a controlled burn as
a protection against wild fire, although he did not recommend its use
as a silvi cultural tool as evidenced by his comments in this report

to the Conservation Commission in April, 1916:

"From our experience we do not recommend the burning
over of forest lands at any time but, if it must be done
for protective purposes and in self-defense, the best time
is in January and February during the wet spell when the
!sap is down.1"Hog Protection
Along with the protection of the lands from fire, hog damage to
young longleaf seedlings was reduced on Urania lands by fencing off
2

Chapman, H. H», "Report on Lands of Urania Lumber Company Under
Contract with the State," unpublished and undated report on file in
the office of the Louisiana Forestry Commission. (The probable date of
this report is 1922).
^Louisiana Conservation Commission, Report of the Conservation n™.

mssion of Louisiana, April 1, 191U - Aprp-iri9I6TW;H. of ttranTTForest Preserve, Urania, Louisiana," p7 SU.
----

Figure 7

Research Plots on Urania Lumber Company Lands»
After twelve years of* burning, wh a t ^3 begun as
a demonstration of the damaging effects of hogs
and fire on longleaf pine seedlings emerged as an
example of the dependence of longleaf pine on
fire to form pure stands, notwithstanding a stunt
ing effect equal to several years’ of growth®
Sources Louisiana Department of Conservation,
Eighth Biennial Report, 1926 - 1928®

45

< < <>in t< ->

Southern Forest Experiment Station)
protected from fire
Longleaf Pine Seedlings—14 Years Old—1927
Roberts Plot, Urania.

‘ourUsv Southern Forest Experiment Station)
BURNED ANNUALLY DURING THE WINTER
Longleaf Pine Seedlings—14 Years Old—1927
Roberts Plot, Urania.
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approximately six or seven per cent of the contract lands.

Although

14
hogs are extremely destructive to longleaf seedlings,

they do not

generally eat the roots of loblolly or shortleaf pine®

Thus, protection

from hogs was not a critical factor since Hardtner as early as 1913 had
decided to manage his land for loblolly-shortleaf pine.

The story is

told that Hardtner first became aware of hog damage to longleaf repro

duction by noticing the regeneration in the fenced-off railroad rightof-ways as early as 1901 or 1905 •

Charles Mohr, who made one of the

earliest studies of forest conditions in the South, had pointed out the
damaging effects of hogs on longleaf reproduction in 189?®

Principally because of the expense involved in protecting longleaf
lands from hogs and because longleaf is an indifferent seed producer,

Hardtner had decided to manage his lands for loblolly-shortleaf pines

rather than longleaf.

He had probably noticed that loblolly was reseed

ing the open areas much faster than longleaf anyway.

While longleaf

pine has always held the popular imagination and is superior to loblolly
and shortleaf in strength, hardness, and rot resistance, Hardtner relied

on fire protection and loblolly-shortleaf regeneration to cover most of

his lands®
The Daily Picayune for May 13, 1913 reported Hardtner as predicting

^One observer has reported watching hogs root up and chew longleaf
pine seedlings at the rate of six seedlings per minute, or an acre of
plantation in a couple of days® (Walt Hopkins, ’’Forest Research in the
Longleaf-Slash Pine Belt,” speech delivered at the annual meeting of the
Southern Pine Association, April 5-7, 1951) •

^Mohr, Charles, The Timber Pines of the Southern United States,

(U.S. Department of Agriculture Division of Forestry Bulletin No. 13.
Rev. Ed., 1897), p. 62®
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a heavy longleaf seed crop for the fall of that year, but the small

area subsequently fenced suggests that he relied less on his heavy long
leaf seed crop than is generally assumed, except insofar as he was
ready to adjust his plans to take advantage of longleaf seeding a par

ticularly barren tract rather resistant to loblolly and shortleaf be

cause of its drier nature and distance from seed sources.
Growth Rate

The Conservation Commission of Louisiana reported in 1923 that
Henry Hardtner had realized six per cent compound interest on his re

forestation program for the thirteen previous yearsThis return

represents an increment which included silvicultural gains plus such
factors as an increased scarcity of wood because of decreased supply or

increased demand, or changes in the economic measure, inflation, all of
which determine the economic return from dollars invested*

It was generally believed in the early 1900’s that the maximum

growth rate based on ring measurements of virgin trees was about eight
rings to the inch, or about one inch in tree increment per four-year
interval*

The tendency seems to have been to think in terms of saw-

timber maturity as a natural absolute, twenty inches or more, rather than

financial maturity of timber subject to the sawyer’s uses*

The point

is that the thought ran in terms of second growth timber competing with

virgin stands at virgin stand prices, prices including no cost of pro

duction.
Tree diameter increment has no absolute measurement for the land

Brief History of Conservation in Louisiana, quoting from the
Report of the Department of Conserva^Ton,
p* 23 •

Figure 8.

Loblolly Pine Stand, 28 Years Old,
Source: Louisiana ConservaiTon Gemini s sion,
Report of the Conservation Commission of Louisi
ana, September 1, 1912 - April 1, 191U

LOBLOLLY PINE. 2K YEARS OLD
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user unless it is defined in terms of number of trees per acre*

Dia

meter growth is reduced by crowding and increased by wide spacing, and
the concern of the silviculturist is to bring a maximum number of trees

to economic maturity, which is a function of time required for the trees
to reach merchantable size in relation to the compounded interest rate.

The virgin forest was generally understood to have been made up

of a patchwork of even-aged plots dominated by the long-persisting ma
ture and decadent trees, and the possible regeneration of cutover lands

was generally expected to be similar in growth rate and characteristics*
The differences between restocking by a limited number of seed trees

over wide areas as opposed to virgin forest conditions where partially

released trees around windfall or fire openings would probably seed
heavily the first or second year were not generally considered.

How

ever, gradual stocking over a period of five to ten years tended to
give a faster growth rate to the young seedlings, and prevented any ten

dency of "locking in" or mutual crowding except in very heavily seeded

areas.

By virtue of his personal observations in this region, Hardtner
must have seen enough cutover land which had restocked to have an in
dependent judgment of the growth rate of second-growth timber.

At any

rate, his estimate of the growth potential of his lands in 1911 was some
what higher than most estimates as evidenced by his prediction of $,000

•7
board feet per acre in 35 years, and 10,000 in $0 years.’

The latter

yield would average about. 200 board feet per acre per year increment.

7
Hardtner, Henry E., * Conservation in Louisiana,” speech delivered
January 18, 1911 before the Yellow Pine Manufacturers Association
Orleans, Louisiana.
*
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Most experts of the day generally anticipated 100 to 150 board feet
per acre growth rate on extensively managed land.

The company present

ly assumes over 300 feet per acre on extensive management methods, but

over 500 feet could be obtained at a more intensive level involving a
higher labor input.

Silvicultural Costs
It has been pointed out that as early as 1913 Hardtner was gen
erally committed to loblolly-shortleaf management in spite of the fact
that 80 per cent of his land at that time was in longleaf pine.

Man

agement for longleaf pine would have involved the expense of woven wire

fencing and hog roundups, while the cost of loblolly-shortleaf regenera

tion was principally the expense of fire protection.

In a letter to the Conservation Commission in 1922, Forest Inspector

Thomas described lands cut by the Ursnia Lumber Company since 1913 and
reported that many fewer longleaf seed trees were left than loblolly.

The area described by Thomas was adjacent to Contract No. 1 lands and
was "hilly to rolling sandy loam frequently cut by hardwood-loblolly
stands in creek bottoms."

Thomas in this letter gave an interesting de

scription of the land logged by Urania Lumber Company:
"The merchantable timber was cut and removed several years
ago by the Urania Lumber Company, Ltd., the south half was
logged by teams and the north half was logged with skidder,
great care was exercised in the logging operations, undoubted
ly the best that I have ever seen, it was not left entirely
barren, and the young timber all bruised and skinned up, the
young timber was protected and left intact, something rarely
seen on the average limbered tract."
"... This tract has an average of five sound seed trees
per acre, 10 inches and up DBH and a total average of thirtytwo young trees and saplings per acre from three to ten inches
DBH about two-thirds of which are pine and one-third hardwood,
it also has numerous scions and seedlings and if fires are

Figure 9®

Pine Seedlings and Saplings, Hardtner Tract®
Source's Louisiana Conservation Commission,
Reoort of the Conservation Commission of Louis-

PINE SEEDLINGS AND SAPLINGS, HARDTNER TRACT
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kept out it will within a few years have an excellent stand
of young timber over the entire area , , ,
Undoubtedly Hardtner left a good deal of small timber intact in

his earlier logging operations.

Chapman observed in his report to

the Conservation Commission on Urania lands under reforestation con
tract in about 1922 that "In some instances this increase in growth
has been phenomenal . . . and there is sufficient timber on the ground
9

to justify a logging operation with teams»"
Although power skidding was adopted in 1917 at Urania, it was ap

parently abandoned in the 1930’s because of its destructive effects on

young trees.

Also, it is part of the high-overhead railroad-spur type

of logging which, once set up, compels the operator to take all he in

tends to get before moving his heavy equipment and expensive installa
tions.

Mule or ox team logging with truck transportation tends to incur

a fixed rate of cost per log, rather than a heavy total cost whose al
location per log is lessened the more the logs brought in*

Until recently the Urania tracts have been managed as uneven-aged
stands due to the young timber left standing, with gradual restocking

from the scattered loblolly and shortleaf seed trees.

Actually, small

group selection rather than individual tree selection has been the pro
The increased efficiency of evenaged management in multiple sec

gram.

tion plots on an extensive basis has led to the gradual abandonment of

this policy.

However, during the early period, regeneration was accom

—
Letter dated March lh, 1923 from Forest Inspector S. N. Thomas to
the Louisiana Conservation Commission. On file in the office of the
Ix>uisiana Forestry Commission.

9

Chapman, H. H., "Report on Lands of Urania Lumber Company Under
Contract With the State."

Figure 10*

Conservative vs. Destructive Lumbering.
Source: Louisiana Department of Conservation, Third Biennial Report, 1916 - 1918*

CONSERVATIVE VS

DESTRUCTIVE LUMBERING.

Above complete devastation caused by modern logging in southern pine. No seed trees
left, and no hope of second growth except by planting
About 300,000 acres of such land
are logged clean every year in Louisiana, and the development of farming and stock-raising
does not begin to keep pace with the destruction. The middle picture shows the result of
conservative logging in shortleaf pine ten years ago. when trees smaller than eight inches were
not considered worth cuttinjc The few trees left seeded up the whole cut-over area, and
planting was unnecessary- The farmer who owned the cornfield kept out the fires, and nature
did the rest. Below, longleaf pine only 27 years old, on hurricane tract
In ten to fifteen
years this will make sawlogs, and today is big enough for lies, posts, pulpwood, fuel. etc.

Figure 11•

Reforestation Projects at Urania Forest Preserve,
Source: Louisiana Conservation Commission, Report
of the Conservation Commission of Louisiana,
AprUTlTT^U - April 1, 1916,

REFOREST Al ION PROJECT S L RANIA EOREST PRI SI R\ E
Photographic views of United States Forestiy Sei vice Experimental Plots and Natural Reforestation from Seed frees.

Reforestation Contract With
Department of Conservation,
port, 19214 - 1926,

Reforestation is a simple matter throughout Louisiana if there are seed tiers and

hre protection

The

mi pictured is under

contract

with

the

plished by the

leaving of small, young trees which existed in the vir

gin stands*
In summary, careful logging practices and fire prevention were

the chief silvicultural costs to Urania Lumber Company for natural re
forestation of cutover lands#

R* D. Forbes, Superintendent of the Division of Forestry of the

Louisiana Department of Conservation, summed up the costs of reforesta
tion in 1918 when he said:

"Reforestation, when planned far in advance of lumbering,
requires little or no investment to begin with, and only a
small yearly cost for fire protection in the case of short
leaf and loblolly pine, and of hog protection also in the
case of longleaf#
The seeding or planting of land to be re
forested with pine is totally unnecessary if one to four seed
trees are left to the acre, or better yet, all the young or
stunted trees below 8 inches on the stump, and these trees
can often be left without expense to the operator* The time
to plan reforestation is before or during logging. If the
matter is put off until after the land is logged clean, plant
ing is of course the only way to reforest#"!*

10

Louisiana Department of Conservation, Third Biennial Report,
1916 - 1918, p. k2.
----------------------

CHAPTER V

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE URANIA REFORESTATION PROGRAM

The Cutover Land Problem

G. Lee, Sre, then Professor of Forestry at Louisiana State Uni
versity, declared in an address before the Southern Forestry Congress

in 1922 that "The 1 cut-over1 land question is the biggest economic,
social and industrial problem of the South, 155,000,000 acres."

In order to evaluate Henry Hardtner’s approach to the cutover land
problem and his decision to reforest his cutover lands by relying on

natural regeneration after he had implemented cutting practices which

left sufficient seed trees on the land, we must skip to 1917 in order

to contrast his views with those of the majority of southern lumbermen,
for it was not until 1917 that the cutover land problem was even being
considered seriously by the southern lumber industry generally.

It

was in this year that the Cutover Land Conference of the South, ini
tiated by the Southern Pine Association in cooperation with a railroad
2
agency (The Southern Settlement and Development Organization ) was held

in New Orleans.
Forbes said of the meeting,

"It was not until over five million acres of pine land
in Louisiana, and 90 million acres in the South, had been

■^Proceedings of the Second Southern Forestry Congress (Durham,
North Carolina
Seeman Printery, 192'0), p. io.
^oore, A. G. T*, Grow Green Gold - The Development of Forest Con
servation Thought and Practices by~Southem Lumbermen (reprint ofa
speech delivered before the faculty and student body of the N» Y. State
College of Forestry, Syracuse, N. Y., November 16, 1938), p. 12.

^7

Figure 13.

The Effect of Fire Protection on Cutover Forest Land.
Sources Louisiana Department oT Conservation, Eighth
Biennial Report, 1926 - 1928.
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iPhoto by Ci.it South, rn l.umlur Co)
PROTECTED LONGLEAF LAND
Protection from fire will bring back mo»t of Louisiana’s cut-over land* if
it is started while there are seed tree* or seedling* left.
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cut over, that the owners of this vast acreage, together with
public-spirited citizens and technical advisors, both State
and Federal, met in April, 1917, to consider the problem of
cut-over land utilization in a systematic way."3

And what was the solution to the cutover land problem arrived at

at the conference?
States was proposed:

The same solution which had been tried in the Lake

sell the land as agricultural or grazing land.

Justin F. Denechaud of the Louisiana Agricultural Department pic
tured the cutover land as the future "market basket of the nation, with
cattle raising the best use.”^

Other speakers recommended that the

land be used for sheep raising and resolutions were duly offered to

rid the lands of the enemies of sheep and cattle:

dogs and ticks.

One of the resolutions of the meeting declared the tick a national
menace and its eradication a patriotic obligation; another proposed a

national dog tax of $1.00 per head as a safeguard for the sheep which

one day might graze the cutover lands.

Hardtner’s reforestation, program at Urania was mentioned at the

meeting by M. L. Alexander, Louisiana Commissioner of Conservation,
but apparently no one considered reforestation seriously as a solution
to the problem.

No resolutions were reported for reforesting the cut-

over areas.

The proposal to sell the cutover lands as agricultural lands to
settlers was the solution accepted by the majority of the lumbermen.

The Long-Bell Company’s handling of their cutover lands offers an appro-

Louisiana Department of Conservation, Fourth Biennial Report,
1918 - 1920, pp. U3-630

^The Daily Picayune, April 12, 1917 > p. h.
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priate example of this approach*$

This company set up a subsidiary,

the Long-Bell Farm Land Corporation, "to facilitate the removal of this
land from the expense account of the company."

By 1930, approximately

165,000 acres (or about hO per cent of the company’s Louisiana hold
ings) had been sold as farm land at $20.00 per acre of which, however,

"only about $3 per acre went to the company as profit, due to the fact

that the selling costs averaged about $16 per acre."

About one-half

of the cutover land sold as farm land was repossessed by the Long-Bell

Farm Land Corporation as the buyers defaulted.

In addition to the

cutover land sold by the Long-Bell Company, about one-fourth of the

company lands in Louisiana reverted to the state for taxes.

Because the proposal to sell the cutover lands in Louisiana as

agricultural lands was unfeasible, the cutover land problem with its

corollary of tax delinquency was still a major forestry problem in the

6
South throughout the 1930*s.

Hardtner as early as 1911 had pointed out the damaging but obvious
fallacy in the rationalization of absolute land use potential.

He

pointed out that there was at that time a tremendous acreage of land

within fifty miles of New Orleans available to agriculture for the
price of drainage and which was capable of producing one bale of cot

ton to the acre.

Any reliance on any but the richest cutover lands for

agricultural uses, he argued, would be so far off as to not interfere

Information about the Long-Bell Company was taken from Helene
King, "The Economic History of the Long-Bell Lumber Company," unpublished
thesis, Louisiana State University, 1936, pp. 18 ff.
^See:

R.

B. Craig, "The forest Tax Delinquency Problem in the

South," Southern Economic Journal, VI (1939), 1U5-16U.
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with the raising of a forty- to sixty-year crop of timber.7

Hardtner

himself before 1920 began grazing cattle on a part of his lands as a

supplementary land use, but even on this land timber was still his

8
main crop.

Forbes in 1918 estimated that 20 per cent of Louisiana»s cutover

lands were too poor to be classed as farmlands,

while classing the

remaining 80 per cent as potential agricultural land, he added:
"• • • while capable of producing crops, (it) cannot be
profitably farmed for three or four decades, because of
the large quantities of fertilizer required, or because
markets and transportation facilities are lacking, or be
cause capital cannot be had for removing stumps ($20 per
acre for clearing $10 an acre landl) and otherwise prepar
ing the soil for cultivation."?

A participant of the Cutover Land Conference twenty-one years later
reflected on the economic failure of the plan to utilize the cutover
lands for grazing purposes:
"Looking back upon those deliberations of 1917 it seems
obvious that the livestock program was doomed to failure
from the start • • • a program essentially based on working
against natural environment instead of with it ... •
During my peregrinations over the South in connection with
this livestock program, I could not help but be impressed
with the prolific growth of our Southern Pines, despite
fires, razor-back hogs and general neglect.
The idea con
stantly emerged from my sub-conscious to my conscious mind;
that perhaps our livestock program was wrong; that this

7

Hardtner, Henry E., "Conservation in Louisiana," speech delivered
Januaiy 18, 1911 before the Yellow Pine Manufacturers Association, New
Orleans, Louisiana, p. 6.

g
Proceedings of the Second Southern Forestry Congress, op. cit.,
p. 95. In 1919 Hardtner experimented with controlling scrub’Tardwoods
by running a herd of goats on his land but found the goats ineffective.

o
Louisiana Department of Conservation, Fourth Biennial Report,
1918 - 1920, p. h0.
-----------------------
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coastal plain area is a natural tree country and that we
should work with nature to keep it in trees. But in the
midst of such musings, the UO-year wait for a saw log
would intrude itself, and I would go back to work on the
livestock program."1$

Thus, the disposal of cutover forest lands by selling it as
agricultural land was tried and failed.

Although Hardtner tried to

show that the market use from which these lands were being withdrawn

was the only clearly profitable use for them, his arguments could not

11
register on the over-expanded, heavily bonded timber industry
which

was looking for a badly needed pot of gold, not another investment*
The majority of the lumbermen were bound by a bigger force, and the

economic organization of the larger mills and the market conditions
into which they had driven themselves made any increase in logging

costs, whether to fact I t tate reproduction or for any other reason,

completely out of the question.

The temptation to improve a tight

economic situation and get out from under a burden of debt by pawning
off cutover lands as "agricultural land" on the public at a figure far

above its value was entirely consistent with "opportunistic, catch-as12

catch-can"

forest business.

The results of this development were the 80 per cent "high pres-

^Moore, op. cit., p. 13.

^Greeley, William B. (Forests and Men, Garden City, N.I*: Double
day & Co., Inc., 1951, PP* U1-U2) described Lake States lumbering just
before it moved into the South as follows: "Its large capitalization
forced not only maximum production, but constant production. Big saw
mills and overhead organizations and obligations to capital could ill
endure idleness.
The organization lost its old-time flexibility to its
markets."
12

Cary, Austin, "How Lumbermen in Following Their Own Interests
Have Served the Public," Journal of Forestry, XV (1917), 289.

Figure llu

A typical Cutover Waste, A Condition of Much Land in
West Louisiana*
Source: Louisiana Department of Conservation, Seventh
Biennial Report, 192t - 1926*

iPhoto by Southern Forest Experiment Station,
Fire and destructive logging have combined to render this land

idle and unproductive.

It

must

be artificially

reforested.

Ox
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suring" cost out of the $20 per acre collected for much of the cutover

land sold, and the creation of rural problems of marginal agriculture,
one of the major detriments to reforestation in many areas of the state

to this day#
One observer in 1920 described attempts at farming some of the
cutover land as follows:

"Anyone who has ever seen the cut over pine land, where
the people are trying to farm ought to realize the sadness
of this situation.
I don’t know which is the sadder, the
devastation of pine lands, or the people who are trying to
live on them. Year after year these people go on • • •
and try to farm on this land. It is so poor that it will
scarcely grow peanuts, but still they go on there and raise
a little cotton and raise corn, and they try to raise cattle*"

Hardtner’s Concept of Interest in Relation to Forestry Investments
When Ashe in 1909 estimated that the Urania longleaf pine lands
"offered a 5 per cent investment only in the event of stumpage attain
ing a value of $8.50 per M feet by 1970," the financial outlook for a

reforestation investment on the Urania lands was not bright*

Ashe’s opinion represented the best scientific view of the day, but
it was heavily influenced by German forestry and German economic views*
European forestry had not been faced with the problem of a virgin for

est subject to rapid exploitation as a brooding presence over the price

of timber, making the cost of growing timber prohibitive*

As long as

virgin timber was available, the cost of timber was the cost of log

ging and manufacturing plus the cost of capital and profits*

Because

of the traditional attitudes of landholders that the clearing of any
land was a blessing, there was no ground rent or cost of growing charged

^^proceedings of the Second Southern Forestry Congress, op. cit.,
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for stumpage, but merely a nominal competitive "market will bear” price
varying from $00 per thousand board feet on up.

As Ashe saw it, Hardtner was faced with the problem of trying to
raise timber to sell on a market that would not make it economically
feasible, especially if initial planting investments were added to the

costs of the land.

The disheartening item in these early calculations,

as now, is the spectre of compound interest which builds up the cost
of an initial investment to staggering proportions over the life of a
forestry investment.

Ashe’s figures were based on the cost necessary

to grow timber plus compound interest compared with current stumpage

prices.
Hardtner, however, used a different method of calculation by com
paring the cost of growing timber plus compound interest with current

stumpage prices upon which interest was also compounded.

The following

tables are taken from a speech of Hardtner’s in 1911 in which he tried
to demonstrate the economic feasibility of reforestation by using this
1h
method of calculation:

"The following figures show what the results would be of buy
ing an acre of pine containing 14,000 feet at $4 per thousand,
its lowest present value, and holding it for five, ten, fifteen,
and twenty-five years, with a two per cent or twenty mill tax
rate, and money worth six per cent compound interest. There are
very few lumbermen whose timber shows a less cost than $4 and $5
would be nearer correct*

Holding for five years
Tax
Probable assessed value for five
years at $25 ..•••••• $2.50
Present value $56 and compound interest
for five years
Tax for five years
Interest on taxes for fiveyears

Total....... .

Interest on Taxes
to End of Period
$0.1^87
7U»92
2.50
.^8

17779(5

, Henry E., ’’Conservation in Louisiana," pp. 7-9.
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The stumpage value of pine five years from now must be about
$5.20 in order to pay cost of holding the land*

Holding for ten years

Tax
Probable assessed value for five
years at $25............. .. • • $2.50
Probable assessed value for five
years at $30
........... 3*00
Total for ten years • •••••• 5.50

Interest on Taxes
to End of Period
$l.h96

>585
2.083

Present value $56 and compound interest
for ten years .............. ................. $100.29
Taxes for ten years..................
• • • •
5*50
Interest on Taxes for ten years...............
2.08
Total cost • ................. $107.3?
The stumpage value ten years from now must be about $7«7O to pay
cost of holding the tinier.
Holding for fifteen years
Tax

Probable assessed value for five
years at $25 • •••••••••• $2.50
Probable assessed value for five
years at $30 • •••••••••* 3*00
Probable assessed value for five
years at $35 • ••••••.••* 3*50
Total for fifteen years.......... $9*00

Interest on Taxes
to End of Period
$2.85

1.80

*68
$5*33

Present value $56 and compound interest
for fifteen years .........................
$13U*21
Taxes for fifteen years................... • •
9*00
Interest on taxes for fifteen years........ ..
5*33
Total cost...............
$llib.5U
The stumpage value fifteen years hence must be about $10.60 in
order to pay the cost of holding the timber.

Holding for twenty-five years
Tax

Probable assessed value for five
years at $25 ........ ......... .. $2.50
Probable assessed value for five
years at $30 • • ............... • • 3*00
Probable assessed value for five
years at $35 .. .................
3*50
Probable assessed value for five
years at £40................... • . U.00
Probable assessed value for five
years at $50
Total for twenty-five years

5*00
$18.00

Interest on Taxes
to End of Period
$7*08
5*59

3*99

2.U0

*98
$20 .Oli
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Present value $56 and compound interest
for twenty-five years • •........................
Taxes for twenty-five years.......................
Interest on taxes for twenty-five years ...........
Total cost . ...........

$21jOb3$
18,00
20*0h
$287*3$

Stumpage value twenty-five years from now must be about $19*88
to equal cost of holding*”
Hardtner added,
’’The state fixes an assessment of only $1 per acre for
the period of thirty years in order to encourage owners of
denuded lands to reforest these lands as a safe business in
vestment yielding reasonable profits, if an investment in
pine timber at
per thousand would run up to $19*88 in
twenty-five years, it can readily be seen that there is a
handsome profit in raising timber for the market at a cost
of $10 per thousand feet*”
Since Hardtner calculated stumpage prices plus compound interest,

he did not have to rely on a sub-market interest rate and ignore the
cost of his land in justifying the potential return on his forestry in
vestments.

To the extent that he understood the full meaning of his

calculations, he must be considered a self-trained economist.
15

Hardtner’s figures differ from accepted calculations

of the pos

sible return on an investment by compounding the present market price

at the going rate of interest to predict future price levels*

This

places an entirely different emphasis on the value of the investment,
then, if all costs are compounded at six per cent over the anticipated

life of the investment, using present market price to determine the
costs which can be incurred and still permit a profit to be made*

Hardtner’s point was that the compounding of interest represents

nothing more than the re-investment of an accrued return on capital*

15

If

''
See: Roy B. Thomson, An Examination of Basic Principles of Com
parative Forest Valuation, DuEe University School of Forestry BuHeiin 6,
January, 1$42, and Ward Shepard, "The Bogey of Compound Interest,”
Journal of Forestry, XXIII (1925)*
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a productive process cannot furnish goods for the market for the cost

of production which includes, under free enterprise, the cost of capi
tal (the going rate of interest), then the productive process must sus
pend operations.

The obvious conclusion would be that if the growing

of timber could not be justified by these calculations, then the land
would have no value as timber land and that whatever value it had would
be a speculative one for agriculture or grazing.

further.

Hardtner’s figures go

They actually recognize that there are different markets in

volved at the time of the calculations and at the time of the fulfillment

of the investment cycle.
As the supply of virgin timber diminishes within the low-cost trans

portation zone, the price must rise by the cost of transportation until

the cost of transporting the ”fundn resource, virgin timber, equals the
cost of creating the nflown resource, the timber crop.

The weight and

bulk of timber and its use as a bulk material make transportation a very

important item in lumber pricing.

German sustained—yield forestry was

not put out of business by American exploitation of virgin timber, and

culled, low-grade stands of second-growth white pine in the eastern
states have become the most valuable stands of timber in the United States,
solely because of their location.^

Miile the virgin timber market determined the price of lumber and

therefore stumpage and timber land values, it was generally seen before
1900 that virgin timber stands in the United States at the rate of cut
ting which existed during the first decade of the century would last only

some forty to fifty years.

However, it was known that the virgin stands

^Greeley, 0£. cit., pp. 121-122.
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of the whole world would last much longer and that the cost of trans

portation is the limiting factor which would determine the feasibility
of growing timber as opposed to importing it.

The economic problem was

to calculate the economic cost of growing timber.
As a matter of fact, the world supply must have been recognized and

the fear for the future, frequently characterized as a "timber famine,"
should have been understood as a very long way off, dependent on the ex

haustion of the vast Canadian and Siberian forests and the inconceivable

quantities of the tropical rain forest.

But though there might be wood

from these sources for a century or two, at what price?

And if the

price were high enough, the investment in growing timber at home would
be less than the cost of transportation on imported lumber.

If the

costs of growing timber did not exceed the transportation costs on im
ported ti mber, then the growth of home timber, as in Germany in the

early nineteenth century, could be a stable and safe way to invest
capital.

One of the costs of growing timber, because of its long cycle, is
the return to capital, which must be compounded as each year’s increment

is carried as re-invested capital.

However, as long as the stand of

timber is growing and what is left reproduces itself by the same per

centage increment, the physical re-investment is keeping up with the
compounding of interest.

"When, however, the stand begins to stagnate,

the standing timber is not re-investing itself in active growth.

Com

pound interest merely means, then, a long-term period of re-investment
until a stand of timber is well stocked with growing wood.

overstocked, the capital becomes watered.

As it becomes

The best time to market tam-

ber, therefore, becomes the balance between the highest average produc
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tivity of timber in relation to the average market return of capital*
The main problem Hardtner had to face in setting out to grow tim
ber as a crop was that he had to be prepared to reinvest over a long
period in growing stock which, of course, was no problem to anyone in

terested in sustained-yield timber production for a stable mill of
rational dimensions*

By first being convinced that foreign virgin

timber sources could not undersell the cost of growing timber, he could

be sure that the only other source of cheaper timber would be from the
speculative holding of mature virgin timber stands for a future market.

Hardtner then figured that the future price of timber would be con
trolled by either speculatively-held virgin stands or the cost of grow

ing timber.

It is obvious from the literature of the day that the

latter was not seen as an active possibility, so that the future price
of timber should always be equal to the present cost of timber plus the

cost of capital invested in holding timber specutively, i.e*, present
value plus interest at the going rate compounded annually.

Kirkland

17

suggested the same mechanics for calculating future prices in 1917•
Using this method, it makes little difference how long it takes to grow
timber as long as the price of withheld timber keeps compounding right

along and the cost of growth is less than the price of timber expected

to be grown.
This approach would have validity only as long as the end price
is assumed to be less than the price resulting from the transportation

barrier barring foreign timber.

Even here, then, the growth rate and

17Kirkland, Burt P*, "Laissez Faire vs. Foresight in Forest Manage
ment,” Journal of Forestry, XV (1917)> 290-307*
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the cost of reproducing a well-stocked timber stand are important.

The simple basis of Hardtner’s enterprise was his feeling that a

stable, permanent mill was desirable and that it could compete suc
cessfully by cutting virgin timber and holding enough cutover land to
provide a continual yield.

The company that bought virgin timber at

market stumpage rates and held it to provide a twenty-year lease on

life for its mill was eaten up by interest on capital tied up in unpro
ductive investment.

Hardtner became aware that, given an idea of the

time it took to grow saw-timber, all that need be bought at present to

supply the required lumber for a mill nineteen years in the future was
the acreage of pole and sapling timber which would provide saw-timber in

nineteen years.

This, of course, was cheaper than buying virgin timber

and holding it.

As we have seen, Chapman was working with aspects of

this idea in his advocacy of the economic feasibility of the second cut
for virgin stands.

Hardtner carried it a step further and assumed that

if it was feasible to invest in pole or sapling stands for twenty years,
then it would be profitable to invest in cutover land to provide the re

generating polewood of twenty years for saw-timber at forty years.

He

knew that timber under then existing conditions had little value until
it reached merchantable size, but he assumed that as soon as the lumber

industry became organized, timber would be valued fairly uniformly in

terms of age and size class as it approached merchantability.
In short, Hardtner realized that it would not pay to hold mature
timber except as a speculative gamble.

Compound interest eats you up

when you are holding an unproductive timber stand.

But if timber is

held that is growing rapidly, the timber compounds as fast as the interest.
What was Hardtner’s secret?

As it appears, the prime basis for all
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of the Urania Lumber Company’s policies was the knowledge of the growth
rate of second-growth timber under given stand conditions.

In addition,

it may be argued that good fortune in getting natural regeneration may
have been one of the economic factors of key importance.

We must face some very important questions before we assume anything
so simple as the above.

Why, with Hardtner buying cutover lands as

early as 190U and 1905, and advocating conservation at every opportunity,

was it 1922 before other companies in the state began taking advantage

of reforestation contracts, at which time many of them had to resort to

hand planting because of years of shortsighted inefficiency?

Why was

Hardtner ignored when he was willing to show anyone who would listen how

reforestation offered a paying basis for cutover land use?

This is, the

point where forest economics as the science of efficient price relations
becomes inadequate and forest economics as the analysis of the ideas and

influences which determine forest industry decisions on a social level

must be resorted to.
We have seen that the only requirement for practically free regenera

tion of pine lands was the intent to reforest before rather than after

logging, plus fairly simple fire protection policies.

Yet many lumber

companies were painfully planting lands a decade later which could have
been in second-growth saplings if they had intended to keep their mills
operating.

Of course, these companies did not intend to throw away future

profits by not considering future forest production; they simply had not

given sound thought to the period that far ahead.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The difficulty of the problem of isolating the fundamental and

original contributions of the Hardtner program points up the importance
of a clear grasp of both the ecological conditions of the time and the

economic and scientific point of view of the day*
Our concern is to discover in what ways Hardtner’s analysis of

the lumber industry and his concept of the life process of the southern
pines differed from that of his contemporaries, and in what respects

his conclusions differed*

In this connection, let us first examine the

possible individual differences in Hardtner’s purposes in the lumber
industry or unique sentiments which might account for his views in

other than social or scientific terms*
Hardtner can be personally distinguished on the grounds of his Ger

man heritage*

Wile this in itself might well have given him a propen

sity to respect German science and might have contributed to a stronger

sense of literary and scholarly interest because of the European orienta
tion of his father’s education, there is nothing to indicate that this

phase of Hardtner’s background did more than make him better prepared to

recognize other people’s work and prepare him to rely on research*
Though many of the influential foresters in the United States at the time

were university-trained men of German origin, Hardtner was apart from

this segment,

He had attended the public schools of Pineville, Louisiana,

and had taken a business course at Soule Business College in New Orleans*

His speeches indicate that he did considerable reading about both American
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and European forestry probelems during his chairmanship of the Commis
sion on Natural Resources in 1908-10,

However, he achieved this

position because of his prior interest in reforestation.

Secondly, Hardtner was born and reared in Pineville, Louisiana,
in intimate contact with the woods which he later logged.

Any sensi

tive person who has been reared in close contact with a natural environ

ment can easily understand the feeling of discomfort which must inevi
tably accompany widespread ’’utilization” and the concern for the changes
being wrought in the landscape.

However, his nostalgia for the great

pine forests and his sense of the beauty of the longleaf pine did not
prevent him from being first a lumberman ready to use these resources.

He was first a lumberman, but he rebelled at the necessity of having to
lay the land in waste in order to utilize the trees.

This revulsion at

the destructiveness of lumbering methods of his day was expressed in an

article he wrote for American Forestry in 1910s
"Go to the forests of LaSalle, Catahoula, Jackson, Winn,
Grant, Rapides, Vemon, Sabine, Calcasieu, Bienville, Cald
well, Livingston, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, St. Helena, and
Washington parishes, where the pine forests flourished in
imperial magnificence, and watch the ’up to date’ method of
butchery. Virgin forests which produce from ten to twenty
thousand feet of timber per acre are being absolutely de
nuded just as completely as you would strip a bird of its
feathers."
“• • • What has the lumberman done? Proceeded to cut up
the forests just as fast as he can, not leaving even seed to
reforest his lands; running his mills night and day; produc
ing more lumber than the country needs, operating without
profit and leaving a desperate country behind him."^

It was this aspect of Hardtner’s personality which spurred his interest in the perpetuation of the forest, and drove him to seek a practical

Hardtner, Henry E.
Forestry, XVI (1910), 26'

"The Crisis in the Southern Forests," American
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means of justifying it in order to succeed in the highly competitive

and growing lumber industry of his day.
Viewed strictly as a social phenomenon, the analysis of Hardtner* s
investments involves basic issues.

As an expression of the expansion

of German culture, a socio-economic adjustment to stable forest manage
ment, the explanation would be facilitated.

However, when we recognize

that the abstracted techniques of German forestry were at that very
time being applied by brilliant, well-educated foresters such as Schenck
and Fernow in the United States, without marked financial success, the

European explanation must be minimized.

At the other extreme of isolated social tradition, if we assume
that Hardtner*s stimulus and success were products of the rough and

tumble American system of development where competition and the dynamic

suggestiveness of mechanical and ecological facts drives producers

inexorably to a higher level of efficiency, and makes them always re
ceptive to new technical developments which will raise profits and im

prove competitive positions - if this be an explanation - then it is

difficult to understand why Hardtner was so lonely in his project for so
long.

The others who came along during the second decade of his profit

able saw-timber venture were most frequently pulpwood producers.

This

suggests that the time element in the productive process is the social

value which needs analysis.
If we grant that cultural dissemination is an inadequate explana
tion of the Hardtner exception, we must turn to the problem of social
or economic change and define the Hardtner approach either as an example

of individual eccentricity, or an illustration of one of the ways in
which economic progress takes place.
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Fran the mid-nineteenth century blossomings of the timber industry,
dynamic expansion had characterized it.

Quick liquidation of invest

ments and conversion to cash, and then re-investment on a short-term
cycle were the rule of the industry as it plunged into essentially ’’free”

stumpage, either by fraud, outright theft, or ridiculously low prices
based on the immediate lack of any other company’s competing for the

vast backlog of virgin timber.

Charles Mohr wondered at the unblushing

openness with which both government and privately-owned timber tracts

2
were logged illegally.

The cost of stumpage was essentially nominal

except for the cost of access.

This set the pace of the timber indus

try, and even when it moved into Louisiana in the 1880’s, stumpage land
sold for as low as $1.25 per acre on lands carrying ten to twenty-

thousand board feet of lumber per acre.

However, the speculator who

bought such tracts was likely to find them cut over without his knowledge,

if they were not subject to frequent inspection, because of ’’errors in

surveys.”
With the anticipated depletion of the Lake States and realization

that the South could also become exhausted, stumpage began to assume
significant market value.

Speculative holding of stumpage became popu

lar with the turn of the century.

Although many large sawmill companies

had acquired vast tracts of timber in the South in the 1880’s, this was
not an expression of popular recognition that stumpage was valuable,
involving the development of a market recognized by small businessmen

and fanners.

This occurred first in the cypress industry and spread to

^Mohr, Charles, The Timber Pines of the Southern United States,
(U.S. Department of Agriculture Division oT~Forestry Bulletin No. 13,
Rev. Ed., 1897), p. 61u
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pine*

In the process of virgin exploitation, when accessibility brings

large areas into economic reach of the market in vast bites as a re
sult of expensive credit-financed transportation and milling facilities,
there is a driving pressure for liquidation and development which soon

brings others into the large area, and a stumpage market is belatedly
established.

With the establishment of a stumpage market, the princi

ples of economic practice change.

Those industries which continue to

carry stumpage as rtfreett unproductive virgin raw material are eaten up

by taxes and interest resulting from the accession of market value to
the stumpage, and the market price is kept down by the actual existence

of "free” stumpage with the credit-liquidation cycle of virgin exploita
tion.

The imposition of taxes and interest charges is essentially an ap
plication of a social standard of productivity and value and cannot
long stand unless expected productivity will cover taxes and interest

charges on current valuation.

Thus, the stumpage values created were

primarily speculative values - values based on the expectation that
stumpage prices would increase with scarcity.

What Hardtner did was to

recognize that there was a natural productivity in the land, and that
these speculative costs of holding stumpage for the future cut of a mill
or for future sale could be offset by the productivity of the forest.

Hardtner realized that any productivity of the land would defray the

six per cent cost of holding virgin stumpage and thus that a one or two

per cent net productivity of wood on the lands being held would be an
important contribution to defraying the cost of holding stumpage to

guarantee a mill’s future.

The relatively cheap expedients of careful
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logging - leaving small trees standing and fire protection - were all

that was required, and since competing manufacturers did not follow
his example, the productivity he obtained defrayed the carrying costs

of his future stumpage, and he found himself competing with the benefit
of essentially "free" stumpage while others paid approximately six per
cent for theirs.

In other words, Hardtner paid out six per cent on

market valuation, but was drawing twelve per cent because he had both

the speculative and natural productivity increments.

Hardtner thus

had a competitive advantage which he invited other lumbermen to elimi-

3
nate,

but he had no takers*

Three influences, all revolving around the "time" issue, seem to

explain the lack of cognizance of Hardtner1 s simple arithmetic*
1. The industry was geared to rapid growth and uncertainty with
a consequent short-run emphasis on quick turnover and liquidity.

2* The credit basis of the lumber industry re-enforced this pro

pensity, and while large entrepreneurial profits were gleaned, re
investment in virgin stumpage emphasized the speculative aspect, rather

than the natural process of timber growth.

3* Social growth, population expansion, and value enhancement by
settlement had geared American finance to invest in social increment

(speculation), which had always been a major facet of any investment in
the rapidly growing country.

V

Moreover, in this context we can see the cutover land problem as

While natural regeneration and growth on an "involuntary forestry"
level did take place and a few lumbermen developed and maintained ad
vanced practices, the market was not set by these and the industry cannot
be said to have recognized the advantages of natural increment as opposed
to the holding of stagnant virgin stands.
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more than just an example of the amorality of land developers and the
gullibility of settlers.

Land speculation had developed in response

to rapid settlement and was unable to adjust to the closing of the

frontiers of economically arable land.
The history of the lumber industry seems to indicate that indi

viduals will tend to follow custom in both the short run and the long

run, custom being logic based on a past analysis.

However, occasionally

an individual, out of personal perverseness, a complex of cultural

backgrounds involving different customs, or because of a habit of sys
tematic thought and keen observation, will question custom, i.e»,

premises, and such an individual will almost inevitably find that con
ditions have changed, and that the old premises are not as valid as

they used to be.

History is full of

Such a man was Henry Hardtner.

prophets, right but ignored, and obviously in a society where the
market is set by the average view, insight or inclination, the excep

tional man will profit by his own wisdom, but will not change the
aggregate unless there is an impetus to imitation.

Hardtner’s urgings,

and those of many of his contemporaries, were ignored because people

did not want to see, rather than because there was anything so difficult
to understand.

Recognition and sincere interest in the profitability of a new way

of doing things came as the cutover lands became worthless as a source
of profit when sold to development companies or stockmen, and when agri

cultural overproduction and more strict regulation of fraud made sales
risky and difficult.

Simultaneously, low timber prices caused by chronic

oversupply brought lumbermen to the point of actually searching for new
ways of reducing costs and increasing profits.

They clung to cutover
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lands for a long time as their hope of increased returns, first for
agriculture, then fruit and pecan orchards and stock grazing, and today

the holding of land speculatively for oil development has removed the
pressure for re-examination of assumptions which have been outdated for

half a century, and allows the acceptance of new methods of land manage
ment to be postponed*
It would seem that the tendency of the lumber industry has been to
change its course of development only when social pressures force it to

do so*

In a small, competitive market the exceptional individual forces

receptivity to change by very obvious improvements which threaten to
drive competitors out of business*

In a large industry with a large

number of mammoth concerns, the insight of one individual may be a boon
to himself, but will not affect the market or force changes because of

the general complex variations of particular advantages and market con

ditions which de-emphasize differences and make expansion and market

adjustments long-term, complicated matters involving vast arrangements
and great quantities of capital.
It is apparent from the Hardtner example that forest operations are

inseparably bound to the developing market utilization and social rela

tionships from joint land-use possibilities.

If there are going to be

cattle in the woods, or frequent fires, or hogs, the land manager must

consider these factors just as he would problems of fusiform rust or

tip moths, rather than railing against such factors because they are
"human influences*"

Within a framework of social purpose, such problems

must be considered in terms of forestry, or efficiency of result over
effort.

A social purpose is inherent in silviculture so that one hesi

tates to sacrifice the forest to rid the trees of bark beetles, since
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the production of wood cannot be lost sight of in silvicultural policy#
Forestry is thus inseparably bound up with a totality of non-urban •

land-use problems, such as non-agricultural land use from hunting and

trapping, cattle grazing, and transportation problems.

The problems

of forest policy can only be handled as part of a more comprehensive
consideration of supplementary industries in and around the woods, as

well as in terms of parish taxation problems and the distance of market
centers for different forest products.

The history of the social condi

tions which make up the economic environment of a forest may be just as

basic to working out sound programs as the ecological history of forest
areas may lead to an understanding of remedies to achieve desired silvi

cultural objectives in efficient ways.
The particular circumstances which made up the Eardtner example,
such as the relationship of remaining virgin timber to the structure

of the industry, the future market and the cutover land problem, are
subject to more meaningful abstraction in terms of economic theory, but
they are no less problems of forestry*

The forest investor who ignores

such problems as will critically affect his operation perhaps is a true

specialist, but he may be a bankrupt one.

One of the most meaningful aspects of the Hardtner investment is the
illustration of relationships involved in the transition from a mini ng

to a reproducing or regenerative industry.

The situation has certain

aspects of more particular application to economic theory.

The timber

industry as it developed into virgin fields opened up large bodies of

measurable stumpage almost instantaneously.

This development process

was chiefly dependent on transportation facilities.

Immediately upon

the development of economic access, a vast amount of stumpage was given
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economic reality, and it was immediately on the market subject to the
pressure toward liquidation of unproductive assets as in mining theory
generally.

However, in the case of timber, the problem of the pressure toward

liquidation is even more pernicious since vast forest areas have a uni
formity which subjects them to the rapid development of mass facilities,
whereas there is an element of uncertainty of the extent of any particu
lar mineral deposit and the availability of others in the immediate

neighborhood which keeps a restraining influence on the pressure toward
liquidation.
The efficiencies of the large sawmill were counterbalanced by its

heavier log requirements and the increasing cost of transporting logs

from greater distances.

The complex of increasing and decreasing costs

tended to set a mill life cycle of around twenty years, balancing the

costs of carrying timber reserves for raw material over the period and

the losses sustained in junking the mill and moving on against the sav

ing from setting up a new, more modern mill close to a new source of
virgin timber, with a low woods-to-mill hauling cost.
When a forest was first opened up, only a few of the mills that it

could potentially accommodate would immediately move into the area and

they took up stumpage for practically nothing.

Speculators took up the

rest, and by the time the virgin mill capacity was built up, stumpage had

achieved a market value.

The mills which bought up stumpage for prac

tically nothing held an advantage, since they had been enriched enough

by the speculative increase that they did not suffer from the burden of
carrying their stumpage.

Later comers, however, did.
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The industry had built up a rule-of-thumb adjustment, actually

an application of marginal analysis, which held that the best coordi

nation between the cost of setting up a mill and the cost of holding a
timber stand was a mill whose capacity would handle the guaranteed vir

gin cut in fifteen to twenty years.

The loss would be too heavy if a

large, efficient mill had to be junked much sooner, since only key
machinery could be salvaged#

Hie losses were balanced against the cost

of carrying the virgin stumpage which was necessary to guarantee a log
supply to the mill against competitors and speculators#
The monumental insight of Henry Hardtner was his recognition that

this pattern of the industry was an institutionalized adjustment to es
sentially "free" stumpage, and that when an area was over half saturated

with sawmill capacity, a stumpage market would develop along with the
speculative boom, and the cost of holding stumpage would become prohi

bitive#

Hardtner in 1911 tried to point out to lumbermen that it was

costing them $92#5U to hold an acre of well stocked timberland for fif

teen years if the market rate of interest was used as the cost of capital#
The fact of the matter was that the lumbermen were finding it un

profitable to cut low-grade timber under these overhead conditions in
the face of competition from virgin stands which at that time had not

established a market price by reaching a stage of development where

transportation and mill capacity allowed a choice to the seller of stump
age.

The average carrying cost of an acre of timber carrying lit M feet

of timber at $U#00 per thousand over a twenty-year mill life would be
$U3»68 per acre, or $3*12 per M feet at six per cent interest, assuming

twenty acres were started with, and one was cut each year#
Thus, what Hardtner saw was that virgin sawmilling would become
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prohibitive on a long-term basis once a stumpage market was set up.
Of course, the small ”peckerwood” portable mill which could count on
picking up stumpage as it needed it did not face this cost of carry

ing a guaranteed source of timber for the marginally requisite life

of a large efficient mill.

The recognition of this situation was the

basis of Hardtner’s understanding and application of what Mattoon called

the idea of forest growths
’’Among the ideas that Henry Hardtner advanced and practiced
ahead of his time in conducting a lumber business was that of
forest growth.
The universal custom of lumber concerns was to
acquire and hold old-growth timber for far-ahead operations.
In the decade of 1910-1920, Henry Hardtner was thinking and ac
quiring young growth timber for his supply in future operations
when his old-growth would be gone.
This is a far cheaper meth
od, he rightfully maintained* than to buy and hold old timber
over a long period of years.4

As can be seen, Hardtner was aware that if the timber being held

for, say the twentieth year’s cut, was growing at a rate equivalent to
the market rate of interest and that if an acre would carry 14 thousand

feet of timber in twenty years, then the cost of carrying these 14
thousand feet for twenty years would not only be erased, but the cost

of the original stand of less than 2,000 board feet (Doyle rule) would
have paid a return, so the difference would be between the compounded

interest on the pole wood stand and compounded interest on the cost
of virgin stumpage.

To cariy this one step further, if a stand twenty years short of
commercial maturity could have a market value, then why not one twenty
years short of this market value?

in other words, the principal of

growth recognized that the span of timber investment belonged within the

Sfattoon, W. R., ’’Dedication Address to Henry Hardtner,” Journal

of Forestry, XXXVII (1939), 762.

-------
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economic grasp of the active market in the United States®

Hardtner

saw the problem in terms of general economics as a problem of price
and markets rather than merely one of efficient yield per acre over
time.

It was not until the growth of the pulpwood industry developed

an economic rotation of under twenty years that discounted market value
began to be attached to seedling and sapling timber in most areas®
The idea of forest growth has its full meaning, as Hardtner saw

it, in a particular context involving the early stage of development

of virgin timber resources.

Essentially, it is a concept that allows

calculated demonstration of the value of reforestation to an individual

firm, putting land in a productive state while it is being held for

future use.
The anticipated development of a timber and timberland market as

virgin areas become developed is no guarantee that the expected market

price will cover the costs of holding incurred by speculators or li

quidating lumber companies.

While money invested in stumpage at six

per cent and held for twenty years should return over $3®00 for every
$l®00 invested, there are enough other factors involved in the lumber

market that the prevailing cost of capital does not necessarily exer
cise a decisive influence, and while the return may be three to one

after twenty years, this may represent a degree of inflation rather
than interest.

However this may be, the central point is nonetheless valid that
within the framework of the individual firm, a six per cent compounded

cost for holding unproductive capital assets is a reality, a cost which

must be based upon speculative or inflationary advances in capital as

sets.

Within the framework of the firm, its planning period, initial
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costs and contractual interest rate, an institutionalized or crystal
lized set of cost relationships is set up within which framework it
can be shown that there will be a dependable saving by initiating growth

on all held assets#
Thus, since a six per cent cost exists, a four per cent growth which
can be kept compounding also will reduce the cost#

An eight per cent

growth, compounding, will erase the cost and become an asset#

"While

such a problem in its mathematical detail becomes one of accounting

rather than economic theory, the elements involved must be considered

in theory#

The rate of compounding or growth of timber of various spe

cies on various sites under various management programs is a technical

issue in the province of forestry#
The significant fact is that Henry Hardtner presented these rela
tionships in their abstract form and developed a convincing argument that

growth of timber was valuable, no matter how small an increment, as long
as it covered the costs of the program of growth initiation#

The only

essential of the program was foresight,^ or pre-logging intent plus some
6

labor supervision and fire protection#

"Involuntary forestry*

result

ing from leaving small or defective trees which later served as seed

sources was not adequate for several reasons.

Chapman gives six reasons

for the inadequacy of the minimum diameter cutting rule which is a form

5
Eugen v. Bohm-Bawork (The Positive Theory of Capital, New York;
G# E# Stechert & Co#, 1930, p# 257) developed the idea of the round
aboutness of production as representing the efficiency of foresight,
thus making possible the payment of interest in increasing amounts for
capital held over time#

^This concept combines an element of validity with the laissez-faire
rationale of an "invisible hand" which makes self-interest consistent
with natural process#
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of "involuntary forestry":

(1) lack of inspection of saw crews, (2)

diameter limit leaves old suppressed trees with poor crowns because

they are small, (3) trees are not selected for wind resistance when
left and many blow down when left isolated, (U) in stands of over
mature timber there are often virtually no small trees to leave, (5)
those trees left are apt to be a total loss due to fires consuming

the slash and debris left after logging, and (6) while leaving this

nucleus for a second cut, no effort is made to protect smaller timber,
which is often smashed in felling, slashed down for skids to support
7

temporary spurs in wet weather, and burned by slash fires.
The value of the Hardtner growth idea lies in defining the char
acter of the relationships during a rather short period of development

of virgin areas.

It pointed up the fact that relatively inexpensive

policies are practical and productive of great savings by keeping land
in active forest production which carelessness and lack of information

turned into virtual wastelands for over a generation in much of the
South.

These considerations will have meaning in the development of the
virgin forests of Canada and Alaska and also in tropical regions where

little is known of the more complex ecological cycles and the generally

assumed overpowering growth potential in tropical areas which encourage
the initial exploiters of virgin forest areas to shrug away any concern

or responsibility for the possibility of weed tree successions that will
destroy the future productivity of the area.

Hardtner showed that his

policy was particularly profitable over the long run while competing on

7

Chapman, Prolonging the Cut of Southern Pine, p. 10.
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a market which had not adopted such a long-term cost-saving program*

The reforestation program which developed in the state during the
1920* s appears to have been chiefly in response to the requirements of

the young pulpwood industry, rather than for the saw-timber market
toward which Hardtner was aiming*

The problem remains, then, of why

Hardtner’s ideas, valid for saw-timber, were not generally applied for

this use*
In answering this question we should get at the failure of the

lumber industry to initiate reforestation during the development of
virgin areas*

The two arguments that cutover lands were worth more

in agriculture and that the profit margin in lumbering after 1907 was

too small to permit any avoidable expense are not satisfactory*

The

cutover land selling program represented a chronic hope of making a
fortune by skinning the public and most of the profits in such sales
probably went to promoters*

The lumber companies would have been better

off having kept these lands and reforested them.

The farming and graz

ing fixation was a reaction against the long-time lapse involved in a
forest investment*

As to the argument that the profit situation in the lumber industry

after 1907 did not justify any outlays which were not absolutely neces
sary in the short run, the fact is that most of the companies operating

in Hardtner’s time had made fortunes on advances in stumpage values,
having bought land with from 10,000 to 25,000 board feet per acre for as

little as $1*25 per acre ^-n

1880’s, and for as little as $10 or $15

during the first decade of the twentieth century*

The value of these

lands had risen to from $40 to $100 per acre as the market price for

stumpage became perfected.

It can therefore be presumed that while there
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was little profit for latecomers or in terms of current market values,

many of the companies, like Urania Lumber Company, were in good economic
condition and if they had not overcapitalized by unnecessarily declar

ing stock dividends, they could have reinvested extensively in reforest

ing their cutover lands.

/
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The long lapse of a forestry investment is beyond the financial

span of activity of all but the very young entrepreneurs in the South,
and although the pulpwood market has alleviated this situation, the
problem still affects the growth of timber primarily for saw-logs, with

pulpwood as a byproduct.

The time element in the timber market is not

a prohibitive hardship on large corporations managed in terms of pre

sumed perpetuity, but for the smaller organization and small landholder,

a smoothing out and uniformly distributing of the market value of grow
ing timber over its span of years would be advantageous.

A 75 per cent

of market value parity program based on the uniform descending progres

sion of maturity value at current market prices of saw-timber suggests
itself as a sound use of parity price supports.

Since all such timber

can be stored on the stump and remains in a productive condition and is

constantly increasing in value, the net effect of such a program would
be a market price emphasizing the saw-timber value of growing timber.

It would also tend to eliminate distress selling by small landholders,
and uncompetitive buying by mills in areas where resulting low stumpage
payments are a deterrent to the stable development of the industry, and

would lead to the eventual development of a more competitive market.

It

would make the southern lumber industry less dependent on coarse-grained,
warp-prone, oversized

pulp logs grown for weight or volume per acre

rather than quality for lumber because of the time pressure of the
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longer-term saw-log cycle#
The development of the pulpwood industry in the South has both its

advantages and disadvantages to the lumber industry.

On the one hand,

it has provided the lumber operator with a market for the thinnings

from his forest stand which helps defray the cost of holding timber until
it reaches saw-log size.

On the other hand, it discourages holding tim

ber for saw-log size by inducing distress selling.

the problem as follows:

One writer posed

"Can the second-growth pine forest of the

South serve two demanding masters, the lumber industry which requires

large, high quality trees, and the pulpwood industry, which operates on
„
8
a small-tree economy?"

The interest rate expressed in various specialized money markets

tends to be an approximation of the physically productive rate at given
values.

In isolated theory, if the value of the physical product is

insufficient to cover the interest rate, the production will be discon

tinued unless there is sufficient demand to raise the price to give the
physical increment a value adequate to cover interest charges.

It is

difficult to argue, then, that the interest rate can be too high, and
as Hardtner knew, the individual who lengthens his planning period re
duces his actual and his bookkeeping costs while selling at a market

set by higher costs of production.
The economic problem which restricts extension of the planning per
iod is the short interest cycle to which all physical production is tied
if it is dependent upon the money market for capital.

In other words,

an economic venture must be able to liquidate or actually do so annually

o
Kaufftaan, Erle, "The Southland Revisited," American Forestry, LXI
(1955), 16.
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before it is a good credit risk on an annual money market developed
around the seasonal trade and productive structure of an agricultural

society.

The short cycle of production tends to fail to average its

expectations for any oncoming year during the prosperous years.

There

fore, on a long-term investment, leeway must permit the avoidance of
depressed markets for contractual liquidation.

It seems, also, that the interest rate contains enough optimism
to be considered as formed in view of a chronic expectation of an op

timum level of prosperity, and is only valid for investments liquidated
under such conditions.

Annual compounding of interest under such circumstances presumes
annual liquidation and reinvestment, and under such circumstances it is
difficult for an investment to show a credit on the books every year.

As prices rise and fall on a variable market, custom in the investment
field tends to limit the extension of the planning period except by

self-financing corporations or individuals with resources which can be
frozen for rather long periods of time.
Under customary views of the day, reforestation did not look good

on paper to investors bound to annual interest payments.

As in other

phases of forestry from land use to standards of intensiveness of sil

vicultural practices, public policy can perhaps best be concentrated on
breaking custom which tends to shorten the planning period.
couragement of long-run planning will increase efficiency.

Any en
The degree

to which forest investors will place confidence in intangible future

expectations of developing physical commodities is as much an institu9
tional as a scientific problem.

Sees John R. Commons, Institutional Economics (New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1934)«

■
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Even before Henry E. Hardtner1s death in 193^, it had become ap
parent that his reforestation program, deviating as it did from the
customaiy views of the day, had proven successful not only from the

standpoint of profitableness to the Urania Lumber Company, but as a

successful pioneering venture in forestry economics which served as an
example to the entire South*

Urania stands as a symbol of a man’s determination to build a
stable community around a logging camp, a determination which bore
fruit even in the heyday of the w cut-out and get-out" policy of the

lumber industry*
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